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Abstract
Title: Software and Hardware Implementation of the RSA
Public Key Cipher.
Author: Paul Brady
Cryptographic systems and their use in communications 
are presented. The advantages obtained by the use of a 
public key cipher and the importance of this in a 
commercial environment are stressed. Two two main public 
key ciphers are considered.
The RSA public key cipher is introduced and various 
methods for implementing this cipher on a standard, non­
dedicated, 8 bit microprocessor are investigated. The 
performance of the different algorithms are evaluated and 
compared. Various ways of increasing the performance are 
considered. The limitations imposed by the performance on 
the practical use of the cipher are discussed.
The importance of the key to the security of the 
cipher is assessed. Different forms of attack are mentioned 
and a procedure for generating keys, which minimise the 
probability of a sucessful attack is presented. This 
procedure is implemented on a minicomputer. Use of the 
method on personal computers or microprocessors is 
examined.
Methods for performing multiplication in hardware, 
with particular emphasis on the use of these methods in 
modular multiplication, are detailed. An algorithm for 
performing part of the encryption function in hardware and 
the hardware necessary for it is described. Different 
methods for implementing the hardware are discussed and one 
is choosen. A description of the hardware unit is given.
The design and development of an application specific 
integrated circuit (ASIC) to perform key elements of the 
encryption function is described. The various stages of the 
design process are detailed. The results expected from this 
device and its integration into the overall encryption 
scheme are presented.
^INTRODUCTION
The use of cryptography to protect confidential 
information has a long history. The Romans are certainly 
known to have used simple ciphers and one exists today 
which is attributed to Julius Caesar. Leonardo DaVinci is 
said to have used mirror writing to protect his ideas. 
Further details of the users of encryption throughout 
history and the methods that they used can be found in 
KAHN(1).
Until recently the main users of cryptography were the 
military. Commercial institutions did not, in general, 
consider it necessary to resort to encryption to protect 
information. Any use of cryptography by commercial 
institutions did not usually consider the security of the 
code or cipher being used. The main objective was to deter 
the casual eavesdropper, and not to secure against a 
determined attack by experience cryptanalysts.
This attitude of commercial organisations towards 
cryptography has undergone a sudden and dramatic change in 
recent years. There are two major factors which have 
influenced this change. The first is the advent of a 
worldwide telecommunications network, and the second is the 
increased use of electronic media to transfer and store 
information. Electronic information transmitted over the 
public telecommunications network must travel by cable, 
radio or microwave links, all of which are vulnerable to 
eavesdropping. Access to computers can now be obtained by 
virtually anyone with a terminal and modem, thus 
introducing the risk that confidential data may be exposed 
even when it is not in transit. The increasing use of 
electronic funds transfer has highlighted the problem not 
only of security but of authentication. Security in this 
case is insufficient, it is not enough to know that the 
data has not been altered between sender and receiver, it 
is necessary to verify that the data originated where it 
claims. Equally important is that the sender of the data 
cannot later disown it.
1.1 GENERAL
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Traditional means of protecting data usually involve 
physical protection of the data itself, for example in a 
safe or with a trusted courier. The increased use of 
electronic storage renders this approach less effective. 
Information stored on magnetic disk or tapes can be 
physically protected by restricting access to the devices, 
however, when these devices are on line, or when 
information is in transit to or from such devices, it is 
vulnerable. Ways of protecting data both in storage and in 
transit are many but the method that is most widespread is 
the use of cryptography.
1.2 CRYPTOGRAPHY
The problem that cryptography seeks to address is that 
of a sender A who wishes to send a plaintext message P to a 
recipient B over an insecure channel. To do this A first 
encrypts the plaintext, using a transformation E, to 
produce ciphertext C. This ciphertext is now transmitted 
over the insecure channel. The intended recipient B then 
decrypts the ciphertext, using a transformation D, to 
produce the plaintext P again. This process of encryption 
and decryption is shown in Fig. (1.1) and can be described 
by the equations :
C = E (P)
P = D(C)
The transformations E and D must therefore have the 
property that D(E(P)) = P to allow B to decipher the
message. In most cipher systems the general transformations 
are known but the specific transformations, which are 
determined by the encryption and decryption keys are not.
The function of the eavesdropper, shown in Fig. (1.1) 
is to recover the plaintext without knowing the decryption 
key D. Eavesdroppers can be classified into two categories 
passive and active. A passive eavesdropper can listen to 
and record, but he cannot alter, the data passing through 
the insecure channel. An active eavesdropper can 
dynamically alter data passing through the channel. He can
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therefore prevent data from reaching the intended recipient 
or he can record messages and send them to B at some later 
time. The active form of eavesdropping is particularly 
dangerous in electronic funds transfer where messages 
crediting an account could be recorded and replayed many 
times while messages debiting an account could be prevented 
from reaching their destination, this illustrates the need 
for verification, not only of the sender, but of the 
message itself. Message authentication can be achieved by 
inserting some non-repeating information, such as the date 
or a message number, into the message prior to encryption.
To recover the plaintext without knowing the 
decryption key D the eavesdropper, or cryptanalyst, must 
use the information available to him. The worst situation 
for the cryptanalyst is if he has a large amount of 
ciphertext, a general knowledge of the encryption method 
used and some information regarding the message. This 
knowledge may only extend as far as knowing the language in 
which the message was written or the probability of 
occurrence of certain words and phrases. This form of 
attack is the weakest and is known as a ciphertext only 
attack. If the cryptanalyst knows some plaintext and the 
corresponding ciphertext, e.g press releases which are 
intercepted in encrypted form which are released later, he 
has more information with which to work. This form of 
attack is described as a known plaintext attack. The most 
favourable situation for the cryptanalyst is when he can 
submit messages for encryption and obtain the corresponding 
ciphertext. This is called a chosen plaintext attack. To be 
considered secure an encryption system must withstand each 
of these attacks.
1.3 SECURITY OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC SYSTEMS
The security of a cipher can best be described in 
terms of the resources required by the cryptanalyst to 
determine the decryption key. Cryptographic systems can be 
either absolutely (or unconditionally) secure or they can 
be computationally secure. Absolute security implies that, 
regardless of the resources available to the cryptanalyst,
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he has insufficient information to obtain the decryption 
key and hence the plaintext. With computationally secure 
systems, however, it is possible to obtain the decryption 
key provided that sufficient resources are available. The 
designer of a computationally secure system must ensure 
that encryption and decryption are fast and inexpensive 
but that cryptanalysis would require more computational 
resources than would be possible to obtain. Computers are 
becoming more powerful and less expensive all the time, so 
it is necessary to include a very large margin in the 
system to allow for future developments. Even with this 
large margin computationally secure systems eventually 
become insecure, thus information which must remain secure 
for a long period of time e.g government archives should 
not be encrypted using such a system. All practical 
cryptographic systems are computationally secure.
With few exceptions it is not possible to prove that a 
cryptographic system is secure. A system is considered 
secure if it has withstood a concerted attack by 
experienced cryptanalysts for an extended period of time. 
This attack would be undertaken under the most favourable 
conditions possible. This process of testing the security 
of a system is known as certification. The only cipher that 
can be proven to be absolutely secure is the one time pad. 
In this cipher the plaintext is encrypted using a random 
key which is the same length as the plaintext. This system 
is absolutely secure as the key is random and never repeats 
thus concealing totally the statistical properties of the 
plaintext. This cipher is not in widespread use as the 
management of keys makes it impractical. To exchange a 
plaintext message the sender and receiver must first agree 
on a key which is the same length as the plaintext. As this 
key exchange requires a secure channel this channel could 
be used to transfer the plaintext instead. The use of such 
a system is therefore limited to high security diplomatic 
links where total security is vital and cost is not a 
factor.
4
1.4 CRYPTOGRAPHIC SYSTEMS
Cryptographic systems fall into two main categories, 
conventional or single key systems, and public or two key 
systems. In a conventional system the encipherment and the 
decipherment key are the same, or one can be easily 
obtained from the other. Two people who wish to exchange 
information thus share a common key. Each pair of users 
therefore requires a different key and the number of keys 
required for large numbers of user-pairs quickly becomes 
unmanageable, i.e for N user pairs the number of keys is 
(N2 - N)/2. Before contact is made between two users it is 
necessary that they both receive a key and this can be time 
consuming for once off or infrequent communication.
1.4.1 Public Key Systems
In public key systems the encipherment key E and the 
decipherment key D are different and D cannot easily be 
obtained from E. It is therefore possible to make E public 
while ensuring that D remains secret. The public keys of 
many users could be published regularly as in a telephone 
directory. Any person who wishes to send secure information 
to a user A need only look up A's public key in the 
directory and use it to encrypt the message. The only 
person who can now read the message is A as only he knows 
the secret decryption key. Contact between user- pairs can 
now be established without the need for a secure key 
exchange and, if there are N users the number of key pairs 
required is also N. The reduced key management problem of 
public key ciphers make them attractive for use in a 
commercial environment where the number of contacts is 
large and constantly changing.
The idea of public key ciphers was introduced by 
DIFFIE and HELLMAN(2) in 1976. They did not however give a 
practical example of such a system. This paper was soon 
followed by two papers, one by MERKLE and HELLMAN(3) and 
another by RIVEST, SHAMIR and ADLEMAN(4), both of which 
described practical public key cryptosystems. These two 
systems were based on a mathematical concept known as a
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trapdoor function. A  trapdoor function is a transformation 
that is essentially one way unless some secret information, 
the trapdoor, is known. Consider the use of such a 
transformation in a cryptographic system. The trapdoor 
function is the encryption key which converts the plaintext 
into ciphertext. Now to anyone, without the secret 
information, this transformation is irreversible. The 
secret information is thus the decryption key. The method 
proposed by Merkle and Heilman is based on the knapsack 
problem while that proposed by Rivest, Shamir and Addleman, 
and hence known as the RSA method, is based on the 
difficulty of factoring large numbers. These two methods 
are the basis of public key cryptography.
1.4.2 Conventional Systems
Unlike public key cryptography, which is of recent 
origin conventional encryption systems have a much longer 
history. This has led to the development of a large number 
of cipher systems being developed. However, along with this 
development there has been a parallel increase in methods 
of cryptanalysis of such ciphers. The two main groups into 
which most ciphers fall are, substitution and transposition 
ciphers.
1.4.2.1 Substitution Ciphers
In a substitution cipher each character in the 
plaintext is replaced by a character from an alternative 
alphabet. The simplest substitution cipher is the Caesar 
cipher, named after its reputed inventor Julius Caesar. In 
this cipher, shown in Fig. (1.2), the alternative alphabet 
is simply the regular alphabet shifted by three places e.g 
A becomes D etc. The security of such a system is very low 
as once the method of encryption is known it is a simple 
matter to cryptanalyse the ciphertext. Variations of this 
in which the alternative alphabet differs are similarly 
prone to cryptanalysis. One method of solution is to simply 
try all possible keys, of which there are only twenty six, 
the second method is to attempt a statistical attack. A
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statistical attack relies on the fact that certain letters 
in English appear more often than others e.g E,A. With 
sufficient ciphertext it is possible to create a table of 
probabilities and match them with standard English. The use 
of a large alphabet in a substitution cipher increases its 
security as the number of possible keys increases.A 
substitution cipher can also be easily broken by a known 
plaintext attack.
To increase the security of a substitution cipher more 
than one alternative alphabet can be used, under the 
control of a key. This is known as a polyalphabetic cipher, 
Fig. (1.4) and is much more difficult to solve, as the 
probability distribution of letters is now much flatter and 
does not resemble standard English. Given sufficient 
ciphertext, however, it is possible to solve such a cipher 
using a method developed by KASISKI (5) . This method is 
based on determining the length of key by looking for 
repetitions in the ciphertext. The longer the key, 
therefore, the more difficult it is to solve. To increase 
the apparent keylength multiple encryption can be used e.g 
if the plaintext is encrypted twice, using keys whose 
lengths are relatively prime to each other the apparent key 
length is the product of the individual keylengths. As the 
key length increases the amount of ciphertext required and 
the time needed to solve the cipher increase, thus 
affording an increasing level of security.
1.4.2.2 Transposition Ciphers
In a transposition cipher the plaintext is split into 
fixed length blocks and the letters are rearranged under 
the control of a key, as shown in Fig. (1.3). The size of 
the block must be large to prevent the cryptanalyst from 
trying all possible keys to obtain meaningful plaintext. A 
transposition cipher can also be defeated by a statistical 
attack. In this method the frequency of occurrence of 
common letter pairs e.g TH, QU, IN is used to obtain 
transformations which will reunite such pairs. A 
transposition cipher is completely vulnerable to a known 
plaintext attack.
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1.4.2.3 Product Cipher
Transposition and substitution ciphers do not possess 
adequate security for practical use. They can however be 
used together to produce a much stronger cipher known as a 
product cipher. A product cipher is of the form ST where S 
is a simple substitution cipher on a large alphabet and T 
is the transposition of bits within a fixed length block. 
Repeated encipherment using a different substitution key 
each time produces a strong cipher. One such cipher is the 
DES, or Data Encryption Standard (6).
1.4.2.3.1 The Data Encryption Standard (DES)
The National Bureau of Standards in the U.S.A issued a 
requirement for an encryption scheme which could be used as 
an encryption standard by the Federal authorities. The 
result was a product cipher developed by IBM and it is this 
which is now the Data Encryption Standard. This cipher uses 
a combination of transposition and substitution to achieve 
a very high level of security. This cipher, uses a 56 bit 
key to perform 16 rounds of encryption on a 64 bit block. 
Each round of encryption is a combination of substitution 
and transposition. The DES cipher is considered 
computationally secure as the only known way of solving it 
is to search all possible keys. With 256 , or approximately 
1017 possible keys such a search is computationally 
infeasible at present. However with the speed and power of 
computers increasing all the time the life of the DES will 
be short lived, by 1990 it is believed that the DES will be 
insecure.
The selection of a standard by the U.S government and 
the subsequent availability of inexpensive and secure 
encryption methods has helped the use of encryption to 
become more widespread. The DES algorithm is available in 
the form of a single integrated circuit which can be easily 
added to new or existing products U«)The setting up of a 
standard also ensures widespread acceptance of the method
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by commercial organisations and thus enables a large number 
of users to communicate with each other.
1.5 KEY MANAGEMENT
The DES is a secure and easily implementable cipher 
but it is prone to the same problem of key management that 
is common to all conventional cryptosystems. The problem of 
key management is two fold. The first is caused by the need 
for each user to store secretly all the keys it uses. This 
is a major problem for large commercial organisations with 
many contacts as the number of keys that must be securely 
stored is large. The second problem is one of contact 
initiation. A user A wishing to communicate securely with a 
user B has first to establish a secret key. This requires a 
secure channel, e.g a courier. The setting up of this key 
introduces a large time delay before the two users can 
communicate. Also if the requirement was only for a single 
secure transaction this could be accomplished using the 
secure key channel and the cipher need not be used.
Public key ciphers, which will be discussed in more 
detail in chapter 2 do not suffer from this key 
distribution problem. The public key of all users can be 
published or held in a public database. This removes the 
need for each user to maintain a large collection of secret 
keys, the only key that must be stored is the users secret 
decryption key. A user who now wishes to establish a secure 
communication channel with another user need only look up 
that users public key. This abolishes the need for an 
expensive and time consuming secure key channel.
Despite this lack of a key distribution problem public 
key ciphers have not yet gained widespread acceptance. 
There are several reasons for this. Public key ciphers, in 
general involve a more complex process than conventional 
ciphers and they are therefore slower. This reduces the 
transmission rate that can be obtained over a channel and 
rules them out for applications in which high speed 
communication is essential. Due to the complexity of the 
public key encryption process no single chip solution is 
commercially available at present. This makes the inclusion
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of a such a cipher into a new or existing product much more 
difficult than with DES.
Another problem with public key ciphers is that due to 
their relative youth there are still doubts regarding their 
security. Conventional ciphers such as DES have undergone 
extensive attacks by cryptanalysts for an extended period 
of time. This is the only sure way of testing the security 
of a system. Public key ciphers being relatively new have 
not undergone such a period of extensive testing. 
Conventional ciphers, such as DES are based on well 
understood principles so the prospect of finding a hidden 
flaw in such a system is quite small. One public key 
cipher, the RSA method, has received extensive attention 
since it was proposed in 1978 and has resisted attempts to 
render it insecure. This system is now being proposed as a 
federal standard (7) • it is accepted semiconductor
manufacturers may produce single chip implementations of 
the cipher. This would enable it to be introduced into 
products as easily as DES. The problem of key management 
would thus be greatly reduced.
1.6 IMPLEMENTING CIPHERS
Methods of implementing ciphers vary according to the 
application. Where speed is not a problem encryption and 
decryption algorithms can be written in a high level 
programming language. This could be used, for example, 
before and after long term storage of computer files. This 
would remove the need for secure storage of computer 
backups etc. For higher speed applications a 
microprocessor, programmed in a low level language, can be 
used. For higher speeds hardware assisted microprocessors 
or dedicated hardware can be used. Cipher systems 
implemented in software can be rendered insecure if the 
programme itself is violated. The ideal encryption device 
is therefore a single chip VLSI device on which the secret 
key is stored, perhaps on EPROM, so that is is never 
available outside the chip.
I
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1.7 OBJECTIVES
The objectives of this thesis are two fold. The first 
is an investigation into methods of implementing the RSA 
public key cipher on a standard microprocessor. The results 
of this investigation will determine whether such a system 
is practically viable. The second part is an investigation 
into the possible uses of hardware to improve the speed and 
security of the cipher.
Various methods of hardware encryption are considered and 
a solution is chosen. The means of implementing this 
system are described and ways of testing it are discussed.
Chapter 2 will discuss public key ciphers. Methods for 
producing public key ciphers are described with particular 
attention being paid to the RSA method. Different 
encryption schemes are compared and the advantages and 
disadvantages of each method is discussed. Ways of 
determining the security of each and the possible means of 
attacking the systems are examined. The importance of the 
key to the security is described and the different levels 
of security obtainable with different key lengths is 
tabulated for the RSA method. Implementation of the RSA 
method, in general, and of modular exponentiation, in 
particular is considered.
Chapter 3 investigates ways of performing modular 
multiplication, which is a vital part of the RSA scheme, 
using a standard eight bit microprocessor. Several schemes 
are described and flowcharts for each are given. A detailed 
timing analysis of each method is performed and graphs of 
the relative performance of each are produced. From this 
timing analysis the time to encrypt blocks of data of 
different lengths is calculated and graphed. The practical 
uses of such a system are discussed and ways of improving 
the performance of the system are considered.
Chapter 4 considers the problem of key generation in 
detail. The importance of the proper choice of key, and the 
implications of key choice for security are discussed. A 
practical key generation scheme, for use on a personal 
computer or a mainframe, is detailed with the aid of 
flowcharts. The expected execution time of the programme,
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and the effect of this on the overall encryption scheme are 
considered. Ways of implementing the key generation 
algorithm in a low level language, for use on a 
microprocessor are discussed.
Chapter 5 details methods for performing multiplication 
in hardware with particular emphasis on the use of these 
methods in modular multiplication. These methods are 
compared and the advantages and disadvantages of each 
noted. The tradeoffs inherent in each choice are 
considered. A method is chosen for implementation and the 
reasons for the choice are given. Various ways of 
implementing this choice are discussed and one is chosen.
Chapter 6 describes the design and development of the 
hardware unit. The various stages of the design process are 
described and the results expected are mentioned. A 
description of the hardware unit is given and the test 
performed to estimate its performance are given. Testing of 
the completed unit is examined. The effect of the hardware 
unit on the encryption process, in terms of the time taken 
to encrypt various block sizes is discussed.
Chapter 7 is a summary of the result achieved by this 
research. The implications of these results are considered 
and possible commercial applications are suggested. Further 
improvements and refinements are considered and the effect 
of continuing advances is speculated upon.
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2. PUBLIC KEY SYSTEMS
The concept of a public key system was first 
introduced by DIFFIE and HELLMAN (2) in 1976. They
considered the problem of key distribution, which is a
major disadvantage of conventional cryptosystems and 
limits their widespread use in commercial environments. 
Their approach was to find cryptosystems which would 
remove the need for a secure channel to exchange keys. 
This would eliminate the time consuming and expensive 
process of establishing a secure channel between two
parties. Two alternatives were suggested, public key
distribution and public key ciphers.
Public key distribution allows two users A and B to 
establish a key, which can then be used in a conventional 
encryption algorithm, by communicating over an insecure 
channel. This insecure channel can be the channel over 
which the conventional cryptosystem will be used. An 
eavesdropper listening in on the key establishment 
procedure must not be able to obtain sufficient 
information to make it computationally feasible to find 
the key. DIFFIE and HELLMAN give an example of a public 
key distribution system which will be repeated here to 
clarify the procedure.
A user, i, who wishes to be included in the public 
key distribution scheme must first generate a random 
number, r± from a finite field GF (N) i.e a positive 
integer less than N. This number is kept secret but the 
user publishes the key, which is obtained from r± by
the following relationship:
r lKt = a mod N
where a is a fixed primitive element of GF(N).
Two users, i and j, who wish to initiate secure 
communication arrive at a common key, Ki;j using the
2.1 INTRODUCTION
15
rir jKi;j = a mod N
rj ri= ( a mod N ) mod N
ri( K. ) mod N
where rL is known only to user i and Kj is obtained from 
the public directory. User j arrives at the same key by 
calculating,
rir jK± j = a mod N
rj( K. ) mod N
whereas in this case rj is known only to user j and is 
obtained from the public key. Users i and j have thus 
arrived at a common key without the need for a secure key 
channel.
The security of this method relies on the difficulty 
of calculating logarithms in a finite field GF(N). For a 
cryptanalyst to determine Ki;j it is necessary that he know 
ri or rj. These are not available directly as each user 
has kept their r number secret. The eavesdropper must 
therefore obtain ^  (or rj from the corresponding Ki. Now
r.
Ki = a 1 mod N
therefore
ri = loga( Ki ) mod N
The system will be insecure if logarithms are 
computationally easy to calculate. The fastest algorithm, 
which is applicable for any value of N, is attributed to 
KNUTH(8) and has a run time which is 0(N°-5). Thus for 
large N (>1050) this is computationally infeasible. Faster 
algorithms are available; POHLIG and HELLMAN(10),
ADDLEMAN(11) but these are generally dependent on some
information available in the public directory. For user
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property of the generator a or the modulus N. The choice 
of a and N should be so as to defeat or slow down these 
algorithms.
2.2 PUBLIC KEY CIPHERS
A public key cipher, fig. 2.1, differs from 
conventional ciphers in that the encryption and
decryption keys are different and it is not
computationally feasible to calculate the decryption key 
if the encryption key is known. In a system of this kind 
the encryption key can be made public. A user, A, who 
wishes to communicate privately with another user B, 
obtains B's encryption key from the public directory and 
uses it to encrypt the message. B can reply by obtaining 
A's encryption key from the public directory. As each 
user keeps his decryption key secret only he can decrypt 
the message, however anyone with access to the public 
directory can send secure information to another party 
without the need for a prior agreement on keys.
In a public key system the encryption algorithm, E, 
and the decryption algorithm, D, must have the following 
properties:
. D(E(P) ) = P
. E, D form a distinct pair.
. It is computationally infeasible to calculate D 
from E
. It is easy to encrypt and decrypt data if E an D 
are known.
The first property ensures that each encryption key has an 
inverse, thus allowing the user to decrypt the ciphertext. 
The second property ensures that each encryption key has 
a unique decryption key. The third property makes it 
possible to publish E without compromising the security 
of the system, while the fourth minimises the work 
necessary for encryption and decryption.
Diffie and Heilman in their original paper did not 
propose a practical scheme for implementing a public key
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cipher. However soon after MERKLE and HELLMAN(3), and 
RIVEST, SHAMIR and ADLEMAN(4) proposed practical public 
key ciphers. The cipher proposed by Merkle and Heilman is 
based on the knapsack problem while that proposed by 
Rivest, Shamir and Adleman, and hence known as the RSA 
method is based on modular exponentiation and the 
difficulty of factoring large numbers.
2.2.1 The Knapsack Problem
The knapsack problem, see Fig. (2.2), is an old 
arithmetic problem and can be described as follows. Given 
a positive integer C and a vector of elements A = {a^
a2,  an} the knapsack problem is to find a subset of A
that sums to C i.e.
n
i=l
where M = {n^.......mn} is a binary vector. The knapsack
problem appears in many commercial applications. For
example a freight company wishing to maximise the value
of cargo carried by boat, truck or air, and given a
finite storage space and a collection of cargo, is faced 
with solving the knapsack problem.
The difficulty of solving a given knapsack varies 
depending on the elements of A. If the elements of A are 
superincreasing i.e if each element a± is greater by one 
unit than the sum of all previous ai,s, the solution is 
not difficult and such a knapsack is called an easy 
knapsack. The simplest example of an easy knapsack is one
based on the binary sequence A = {1,2,4,8,..... } and in
this instance the solution is trivial. The binary vector M 
is simply the binary representation of C. Not all
knapsacks are easy to solve, the generalised knapsack 
problem is known to belong to the class of problems known 
as NP-complete which can not be solved in polynomial time 
on a deterministic machine. The best known algorithm for 
solving the knapsack problem is attributed to
1 8
SCHROEPPEL (12) and takes 0(2n/2) in time and 0(2n/4) in 
memory. This information does not help greatly in 
determining how the knapsack problem can be used in 
developing a public key cipher as it tells us that at 
best a solution to the knapsack problem is trivial while 
at worst it is computationally infeasible, for large n.
To make use of the knapsack problem as a public key 
cipher Merkle and Heilman constructed a trapdoor by 
taking an easy knapsack and transforming it into a hard 
knapsack. Anyone not possessing the secret trapdoor 
information would find it computationally infeasible to 
solve the knapsack, however, with the trapdoor
information the problem can be converted to an easy 
knapsack and quickly solved.
To construct a trapdoor knapsack it is first 
necessary to form an easy knapsack by choosing a set of 
elements A = {a.,_...an} such that A is superincreasing i.e
i-1
ai > S
j ' l
Then choose two large numbers, a modulus, r and, a 
multiplier, s that are relatively prime i.e gcd(r,s) = 1.
Use these numbers to calculate the hard knapsack B =
{b1 bn} where bi is :
bt = s . ai mod r
The elements of b are not superincreasing and thus B is a 
hard knapsack. This hard knapsack B = {bj_....bn}
constitutes the users public key. All other information, 
particularly s,r,A should remain secret.The decryption 
key d, which is the multiplicative inverse modulo r of s
i.e ds 1 ( mod r ), can be calculated and should also
be kept secret.
A user X who wishes to send a secure message M = 
{m1...mk}, where m± is a binary digit, to user Y first
breaks the message into n bit blocks. These blocks are 
then encrypted using Y's public key producing the
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ciphertext C where
C
i=l
n
= M.B =  y  I t l j b i
XI
where B = {bx.....bn) is the public encryption key of Y.
The ciphertext can now be transmitted to Y over an 
insecure channel. On receipt of the ciphertext, C, user Y 
retrieves the plaintext by applying his secret decryption 
key d :
n n
dC = d 'y mibi = ^ dmjbj
i=l i=l
db. =  dsai =  a± (mod r)
ds =  1 (mod r)
n
dC = m^i (mod r)
i=l
and the problem is to recover m.. . This is now an easy
knapsack problem as the set A = {a-L...... an} is
superincreasing.
The following simple example illustrates the method :
However,
as.
Thus
A  = { 1,3,5,10 } 
r = 23 
s = 9
The easy knapsack A = { 1,3,5,10 } is transformed into the 
hard knapsack B .
B = A.s mod r
= (9 mod 23,3*9 mod 23,5*9 mod 23,10*9 mod 23)
= (9, 4, 22, 21)
this is the users encryption key which can be published 
in a directory or a public database. The decryption key 
can be calculated by solving
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ds —  1 ( mod r ) 
d*9 =  1 ( mod 23 )
using Euclids algorithm, resulting in d = 18. This key
should not be disclosed. To encrypt a message M = 7 =
(0111)2 to form ciphertext C use
C = B.M = 9 + 4 +  22 = 3 5 =  (100011)2
The ciphertext can be decrypted by using the secret key d 
to form the simple knapsack E.
E = dC = 18*35 ( mod 23 ) = 9
This simple knapsack (E,A) can be solved to give M. Such a
knapsack can be solved in linear time.
The security of the knapsack cipher system relies on 
the difficulty of solving hard knapsacks. As mentioned 
previously the fastest known algorithm can solve an nth 
order knapsack in time 0(2n/2) . For this to be
computationally infeasible it is recommended that n be
greater than 100. If n is 100 then the time taken to 
solve the hard knapsack, assuming that a single operation 
takes one microsecond, is approximately 109 seconds or 32 
years. However a large number of processors working in 
parallel would reduce this time considerably and this 
would have to be considered when choosing n.
The choice of A, r and s is also important to the
security of the cipher. These should be chosen from a
sufficiently large set so that a direct search is not 
computationally feasible. For n = 100 Merkle and Heilman 
recommend that the numbers be chosen from the following 
ranges :
2201 +1 £ r C 2202 _i
2 d ^ r - 2
1 s< % s< 2100
2 100 +1 4 a2 4 2*2ioo
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3*2100 +1 C a3 ^ 4*2ioo
•  *  •
*  •  *•
(2 i _ 1 -l)2ioo + i  ^  a± <  2i-i.2ioo
This ensures that each parameter is can have one of 2100 
possible values thus defeating a direct search. Note that 
as each element of the public key B is less than r they 
will require 202 bits each for their representation. Thus 
the public key of each user will require approximately 
20k bits of storage. An n bit message M when encrypted 
will require 202 + log2(100) or 209 bits to represent it. 
The message is therefore expanded by a factor of 2.09. If 
the ciphertext is to be transmitted over a bandlimited 
channel this will result in a halving of transmission rate 
when compared with unencrypted transmission.
2.2.2 The RSA Cipher
The RSA public key cipher is based on modular 
exponentiation and the difficulty of factoring large 
numbers. To encrypt a plaintext message, M, it is first 
divided into blocks and then raised to the eth power 
modulo N, where e and N are the encryption keys of the 
user i.e
C = Me Mod N
The size of the plaintext block should be such that M is 
always less than N. To recover the plaintext from the 
ciphertext, the ciphertext C is raised to the dth power 
modulo N where d is the users decryption key i.e
M = Cd Mod N
Note that as all arithmetic is performed modulo N there is 
no data expansion from plaintext to ciphertext.
To make use of this method in a public key cipher the 
key parameters e,d,N have to be carefully chosen. Rivest, 
Shamir and Adleman recommend the following procedure for 
their selection.
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First choose two large prime numbers p and q. There are 
restrictions necessary when choosing such primes to ensure 
that the cipher is resistant to cryptanalysis. These 
restrictions and the procedures for choosing large primes 
will be described in a later chapter. These primes must 
be chosen from a large enough set that a direct search is 
computationally infeasible. The modulus N is the product 
of these two primes:
N = pq
The encryption key, e, can now be chosen to be a large 
random number that is relatively prime to (N) where 0(N) 
is the Euler totient function of N :
gcd( e, j#(N) ) = 1
where gcd is the greatest common divisor. The Euler 
totient function of an integer, N, is the number of 
integers less than N and relatively prime to N. For a 
prime number the Euler totient function is one less than 
the prime number itself so
0  (N) = JBT (pq) = (p-1) (q-1)
This is the users encryption key and it can be published, 
along with N , in a public directory or database. The 
decryption key, d, can be calculated as the multiplicative 
inverse of e modulo ^(N) . Such a number exists and is 
unique as e is relatively prime to ^(N) . the decryption 
key is therefore given by:
ed s  1 (Mod ^ (N) )
This equation can be solved using Euclids algorithm to 
find d. This is the decryption key of the user and it 
should not be made public. Note that due to the nature of 
the cipher e and d are interchangeable and either one can 
be made public retaining the other to use as a decryption 
key.
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To test the validity of the RSA cipher it is 
necessary to prove that decryption of an encrypted 
message will yield the original plaintext i.e
D ( E (M) ) = M
where D denotes the decryption function and E the 
encryption function. For the RSA cipher
E (M) = C = Me Mod N
D (E (M) ) = D(C) = Cd Mod N = (Me Mod N) d Mod N 
= Med Mod N
ed = 1 ( Mod jgf(U) )
ed = ki^NJ+l , for some integer k. 
kJ3T(N)
D(E(M)) = M.M Mod N
Now for any integer, a, relatively prime to 0(N) Eulers
generalisation of Fermats theorem states that :
jS'(N)
a =  1 ( Mod N ) , for any integer a.
therefore
D (E (M) ) =  M (Mod N) 
and as M is less than N :
D (E (M) ) = M
Thus it is seen that the functions described in the RSA
method do perform encryption and decryption.
As an example of the use of the RSA cipher consider 
the following example, note that the numbers involved
here are too small for a practical cipher but the method
is the same.
Choose p and q , the random primes to be: 
p = 53, q = 61
and
but
=>
thus
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Hence the modulus N is 53 * 61 = 3233 and j#(N) the Euler 
totient function of N, is 52 * 61 = 3172. To choose e we 
select a number in the required range and check to see if 
it is relatively prime to ,0(N) . If it is not another 
number must be used, let d = 279, which is relatively 
prime to 3172, this can be proven using Euclids 
algorithm. To find the encryption key e we need to solve 
the equation :
d * 279 = 1 ( Mod 3172 )
this can again be solved using Euclids algorithm. This 
results in a value for e of 71. To encrypt the message 
RENAISSANCE we first assign numbers to each letter say A
= 00 Z = 25 and then divide the message into 4 digit
blocks. This gives
M = ( 1704 1300 0818 1800 1302 0426 )
To encrypt this message each block is raised to the power
of 71 modulo 3172 giving the ciphertext C
C = ( 3106 0100 0931 2691 1984 2927 )
To recover the plaintext message M the same procedure is
carried out with d = 279 as the exponent.
The security of the RSA cipher relies on the 
difficulty of finding d when e and N are known. As d is 
the multiplicative inverse of e modulo ^(N) it is 
necessary to determine ^(N) . j2f(N) is formed by
subtracting one from each of the prime divisors of N and 
forming their product i.e
JT(N) = (p-1) (q-1) = l +  N -  p -  q
If p and q are known 0(N) can be calculated and the 
decryption key d can also be found. The problem therefore 
reduces to finding the prime factors p, q of N. Factoring 
a number into its prime factors is easy when N is small 
but becomes increasingly more difficult as N increases.
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Various factoring algorithms have been suggested and 
KNUTH(8) describes some of these in detail. The fastest 
known algorithm for factorisation attributed to
SCHROEPPEL and detailed in KNUTH(Q , pp. 380-384) has a 
runtime of the order of nr where r is :
( Ln (N) * Ln (Ln (N) ) ) 1/2
Even with this algorithm the time required to factor N, 
for large N, is excessive. A table of the time required 
to factor N for various sizes of N and assuming that one 
operation takes one microsecond is given in Fig. (2.3). 
From this table it can be seen that for N greater than 
10100 calculating the prime factors is computationally 
infeasible. To protect against future increases in the 
speed and power of computers Rivest, Shamir and Adleman 
recommend choosing N to be 0(10^00) 200 digits. This
would require approximately 3.8*10^ years to factor. This 
should provide a secure cipher for a long time regardless 
of progress in computer technology. Other methods of 
attack are possible (Rivest,Shamir,Adleman(4)) but these 
are all believed to be equivalent to factoring N and thus 
would require the same computational resources.
2.3 COMPARISON OF PUBLIC KEY CIPHERS
The knapsack method and the RSA method are the main 
contenders in the field of public key cryptography. The 
knapsack cipher has the advantage that encryption and 
decryption are fast as only modular multiplication and 
addition are required. The RSA method is more complex 
requiring modular exponentiation and this is time 
consuming. The public key size required for a knapsack 
cipher is approximately 20k bits whereas for the RSA the 
key memory required is about 1.2k bits. The RSA cipher 
does not expand the data from plaintext to ciphertext as 
the plaintext and ciphertext space are the same. This 
allows the RSA to be used to authenticate messages by 
forming digital signatures. The knapsack cipher does 
expand the data and thus it can be used for secrecy or
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authentication but not both. The ability of the user of an 
RSA system to choose the level of security is also an
advantage. There has been doubts cast on the security of
the knapsack cipher,('^which undermines confidence in the 
method. The RSA method has, so far, remained secure, 
providing the keys are chosen properly. This confidence 
in the RSA method and the advantages that a public key 
cipher provide when compared to a conventional cipher has 
led to it being proposed as a national standard in the 
U.S. A ( ZIMMERMANN (7) ) . The main difficulty with the RSA
cipher is the complexity of the encryption and decryption
process. Using dedicated hardware the DES cipher, a
conventional cipher, has a throughput in the megabits/sec 
range. To be successful in a commercial environment the 
RSA method must attain a speed comparable to or at least 
the same order as the DES. The objective of this report 
is to investigate ways of implementing the RSA cipher.
2.4 MICROPROCESSOR IMPLEMENTATION OF RSA CIPHER
The first objective is to investigate the 
implementation of the RSA cipher on a microprocessor. 
This would be an inexpensive and flexible method of 
implementation that would have many commercial 
applications. If it is possible to produce a programme 
that will enable a reasonable throughput rate it could be 
included in many devices already utilising microprocessors 
providing a high level of security for a small cost.
The choice of an 8 bit microprocessor for use in 
implementing the RSA cipher is based mainly on power, cost 
and the availability of a development system. The 
microprocessor in common use in the N.I.H.E is the MC6809 
from Motorola. This is considered one of the most powerful 
8 bit microprocessors due to its flexible addressing 
methods and its use of a hardware multiplier. Development 
systems for this microprocessor were readily available in 
the college, consisting of VAX based assemblers and 
simulators, and real time emulators. The suitability of 
this processor and the time delay incurred in the 
purchase of development systems should an alternative be
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used, motivated the use of the MC6809 in the
implementation of the RSA cipher. As all 8 bit 
microprocessors are basically similar the results obtained 
using this microprocessor should be immediately
applicable to other microprocessors.
2.4.1 Modular Exponentiation
The basis of the RSA cipher is modular 
exponentiation. As the encryption and decryption
algorithms are similar we need only consider one or the 
other. The objective therefore is to find ways of 
calculating C where
C = Me Mod N
where N,e,M are of the order of 200 decimal digits or 600 
bits. This calculation must be performed on an 8 bit 
microprocessor.
To calculate Me, M could simply be multiplied by 
itself e times. This requires e multiplications. However 
not all of the partial products are necessary. Consider 
the case when e is a power of two say e = 16. This would 
require 16 multiplications if the simple method above is 
used. The number of multiplications can be dramatically 
reduced by squaring each partial product i.e forming M, 
M2, M 4, M ® , M 1^. This has reduced the number of
multiplications to 4 and in general only Log2 (e) 
multiplications are required if e is a power of 2. This 
method can be expanded to include any arbitrary e by 
using the following algorithm, known as exponentiating by 
repeated squaring and multiplying. This method is an 
extension of the binary method described by KNUTH(8, 
pp.441-443) to numbers of arbitrary radix. This method is 
described below:
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First Multiplication :
Let the result C be equal to M. This carries out the 
first multiplication so reduce e by one. A temporary 
variable T is needed to hold the partial product and this 
should be initialised to M also.
: If e is odd : Let C = C * T and reduce e by one.
: If e is even : Let T = T2 and divide e by two.
: Repeat until e is zero.
To demonstrate the method consider the example M ^ .
First C = M, T = M, e = 36
Then e is even : T = T2 = M2, e = 18
e is even : T = T2 = M 4, e = 9
e is odd : C  = C*T = M.M4, e = 8
e is even : T = T2 = M 8, e = 4
e is even : iji _  rp 2  — j j j l  6 e = 2
e is even : T = t 2 = M32, e = 1
e is odd : C  = C*T = M5 .M32 /e = 0
The number of multiplications necessary to calculate M^7 
is thus 7 which is a large reduction on the 37 required 
by the direct method.
To calculate the number of multiplications required 
for arbitrary e consider the binary representation of e, 
(eg.-.e^). To test if e is odd or even it is only 
necessary to determine whether eg, the least significant 
bit, is one or zero. A •zero would imply that e is even, a 
one that it is odd. In the squaring and multiplying 
method described above if e is even we calculate T2 and 
divide e by 2 whereas if e is odd we calculate C*T and 
decrease e by one. Reducing an odd number by one results 
in an even number. Therefore an odd number is equivalent 
to an even number followed by an extra multiplication 
(C*T) in the above method. The number of times that e can 
be divided by two is 1092 • The total number of
multiplications required is log2(e)+D where D is the 
number of extra multiplications required because e is 
odd. Dividing by two, in binary, is equivalent to
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shifting right by one bit/ thus the number of times that e 
can be odd is equal to the number of ones in the binary 
representation of e or the Hamming weight of e. Therefore 
the total number of multiplications is given by :
NM = log2 (e) + w(e)
where w(e) is the Hamming weight of e. The worst case 
condition is when e contains all ones in which case w(e) 
= log2(e) and the number of multiplications required is :
NMmax = 2*log2 (e)
A flowchart describing this exponentiation method is shown 
in F i g (2.4).
2.4.1.1 Results
A programme was written in MC680 9 assembly language 
to implement the algorithm described in Fig. (2.4). While 
it may be possible to compress the programme further the 
times given below represent an approximate run time which 
would not be significantly altered by variations in 
programming techniques. The MC6809 is an 8 bit
microprocessor therefore all calculations are performed 
on 8 bit bytes. The worst case time to encrypt a message 
M using a key (e,N) in which e and N can be represented 
by Nb bytes is C2.0) :
Te = 53 + 2583 (Nb ) + 2432 (NB ) 2 + 32 (NB ) TMod [NB ] cycles
where TMo d [NB ] is the number of cycles required to 
calculate the product of two NB byte numbers modulo a 
third Nb  byte number.
A cycle is one microsecond on the standard 1MHz 
microprocessor. Various methods for performing modular 
multiplication and the resulting overall encryption will 
now be discussed.
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3. Modular Multiplication Methods
Modular exponentiation requires that modular 
multiplications be performed. In the RSA public key cipher 
it is necessary to calculate the product AB (mod N) where 
A, B, N are positive integers of the order of 100 decimal 
digits or 330 bits. Calculations on numbers of this size 
cannot be performed directly on a standard microprocessor 
whose word size is much smaller than this, typically 8 or 
16 bits. It is thus necessary to consider such 
calculations as multiple precision calculations. It is
convenient to use the word size of the computer as the 
radix for all calculations thus a 336 bit number becomes a 
42 digit number on an 8 bit microprocessor such as the
MC6809. It is considered that the multiplication of two
single digit numbers to form a double precision result is 
a primitive operation of the microprocessor.
To form the product C = AB (Mod N) two approaches are 
possible. The first forms the product C = AB and then 
reduces this modulo N to complete the calculation. This
entails the use of memory to store the double length 
result prior to its reduction. The second method achieves 
the reduction modulo N simultaneously with the formation 
of the product AB. This removes the need to store a double 
length result as the product is a single length number, 
however such methods are generally slower than the former 
methods.
The reduction of an m digit number C modulo N where N 
is an NB digit number is the remainder when C is divided 
by N and is therefore less than N. Multiple precision 
division and subtraction are thus needed for reduction. 
The process of performing modular multiplication is one of 
multiple precision multiplication of two single length 
numbers to provide a double length result followed by 
multiple precision division and subtraction to reduce this 
number modulo N.
3.1 INTRODUCTION
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3.2 MULTIPLICATION
The conventional 'pen and paper' method for forming 
multiple precision products is known as the sum of 
products method. In this method the first operand is 
multiplied by each digit of the second operand forming a 
number of partial products. These partial products are 
then shifted and added to obtain the result. As an example 
consider multiplying 814639 by 462115 :
Multiplicand: 814639
Multiplier: x 462115
Result: 376456301485
When implementing this method on a computer it is more 
efficient in both time and memory to add the partial 
products as they are produced instead of storing each 
result and adding when all partial products are obtained.
In the general case for numbers of arbitrary radix 
consider the product of A = (ag,...a^-i)r and B = 
(bg/• • .bs_]_) r where the a^'s and b-^'s are digits in radix 
r. The radix r is usually chosen as the word length of the 
computer being used e.g r = 256 for an 8 bit
microprocessor such as the MC680 9. The product of A and B 
is therefore :
4073195
814639
814639
t-1 s-1
i=0 j=0
This can be written as :
t-1 s-1
i=0 j=0
where Pj_ is the partial product. It can be seen from this 
that s*t single precision multiplications are required 
along with multiple precision additions.
This algorithm was implemented in assembly language on 
the MC6809 microprocessor and a flowchart describing the 
programme is shown in Fig.(3.1a). The digits of the 
multiple digit numbers A and B were stored in successive 
memory locations. A pointer to the operands and the number 
of digits contained in each was also kept. This 
facilitates the addressing and manipulation of the
operands. The time taken to calculate the product is given 
below.
Tmult = 62 + 11 (s+t) + s( 45 + 49t ) cycles
= 62 + 56s + lit + 49st cycles
In the RSA public key cipher s and t will tend to be the 
same as all multiplication is done modulo N, thus the
maximum value for either operand is N. If NB is the number 
of digits in N then and if s = t = NB then the
multiplication time is :
TmultfNB ] = 62 + 67 (Nb ) + 49(NB )2 cycles
The time taken to multiply numbers of differing precision
is shown in Fig. (3.1b) . In this case a clock cycle is
taken as being equal to 1 microsecond as in the standard 
MC6809. The area of particular interest, to the RSA
cipher, in this figure is the multiplication of numbers in 
the 40 to 80 byte range as this provides a significant 
level of security. It can be seen that a multiplication of 
this size takes from 80 to 320 milliseconds.
3.3 REDUCTION MODULO N
To represent a number C in modular form it is 
necessary to find an integer R such that :
C =  R (mod N)
Therefore C = Q.N + R where Q is some integer. This is 
equivalent to dividing C by N to obtain a quotient Q and a 
remainder. Reduction modulo N is thus very similar to
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division except that in this case it is the remainder and 
not the quotient that is of interest. It is therefore 
necessary to consider ways to implement multiple precision 
division. Three methods are considered :
1. Division by repeated shift and subtract.
2. Division using KNUTHs algorithm.
3. The calculation of reciprocals and its use in 
division.
3.3.1 Division by repeated shift and subtract
The shift and subtract method of division is similar 
to the familiar 'pen and paper' division in common use. In 
this the quotient is obtained one digit at a time and the 
divisor is subtracted from the divisor at decreasing 
levels of significance until the calculation is complete. 
Two types of division using this method can be defined, 
restoring or non-restoring division. In restoring 
division, if a trial subtraction is unsuccessful i.e the 
partial remainder is less than zero the partial remainder 
is restored to its previous value, the divisor is shifted 
right and another trial subtraction is made. In 
non-restoring division, however, if a trial subtraction is 
unsuccessful the partial remainder is not restored instead 
the next trial becomes an addition. This has the advantage 
that it is not necessary to retain an unmodified version 
of the partial remainder or to perform an additional 
addition to restore the remainder. Non-restoring division 
can easily be implemented when twos complement numbers are 
being used, however, when dealing with unsigned integers 
the restoring method is preferred. This can be described 
as shown below:
Let the dividend C be ( cm _^cm_2 .. . eg )2 and let the 
divisor N be ( dn_^dn_2 . . • dg )2 where and d^ are binary 
digits then the algorithm is :
1 . From the divisor N form an m bit number by adding 
m-n trailing zeros.
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N ( dn-l^n-2••^O^m-n^m-n-1• • • ^ 2
2. Subtract the divisor N from the dividend C to form 
the partial remainder.
If the partial remainder is negative the quotient 
bit is zero otherwise it is one. As the quotient 
is not required in this application it is not 
necessary to store it.
3. If the partial remainder is negative then restore 
it by adding N.
4. The divisor is now shifted one bit to the right 
and steps (2) to (4) are repeated.
5. The algorithm ends when the divisor has been 
shifted m-n times.
As an example of this method consider dividing (11001001)2 
by (111)2 .
Ill I 11001001
C = C - N
C = C + N
111
1111 : remainder is negative => Q5=0
1100
111
101
: restore partial remainder
: remainder is positive => Q4=l
1011
111
100 : remainder is positive => Q3=l
1000
111
1 : remainder is positive => Q2=l
10
111
1011 : remainder is negative => Q1=0
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101 : restore partial remainder
111
1110 : remainder is negative => Q0=0
101 : restore partial remainder
Therefore (11001001)2/(111)2 = (11100)2 plus a remainder
of (101)2 or :
(11001001)2 =  (101)2 (Mod (111)2)
This algorithm was implemented in assembly language on an 
MC6809 microprocessor. A flow chart of this algorithm is 
given in Fig.(3.2a). The run time of the algorithm was :
Td1 = 638 +486(NC-NB ) +208(NC-NB )2 
+ 8 (Nc -Nb +1)[105 +123(NC-NB )]
= 1478 + 2310(Nq -Nb ) + 1192(Nc -Nb )2
where N q is the number of bytes in the dividend C and NB 
is the number of bytes in the divisor or modulus N. The 
dividend will in the case of the RSA cipher contain a 
maximum of twice as many digits as the divisor (it is the 
product of two Nb digit numbers) thus Nc = 2NB therefore,
Td1 = 1478 + 2310(Nb ) + 1192(NB )2
A table and graph showing the variation of the division 
time Td1 for differing values of NB is shown in 
Fig.(3.2b). As in the case of multiplication we are 
particularly interested in the range from 40 digits to 80 
digits and it can be seen that reduction of an integer of 
this size takes from 2 to 8 seconds. It is again noted 
that one clock cycle is of 1 microsecond duration.
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3.3.2 Division using KNUTHs algorithm
The disadvantage of the previous method is that it 
does not utilise the power of the microprocessor 
efficiently. The algorithm deals with bits at a time 
whereas the microprocessor can more readily deal with 
bytes. An algorithm which can be used with computers of 
arbitrary radix is KNUTHs(8) algorithm. The purpose of 
this algorithm is to approximate the 'pen and paper' 
method of division. Consider the case of an Nq digit 
dividend C = (cNc_]_. . . . c q ) r divided by an NB digit divisor 
N = (dNB_^...dg)r • The first step is to divide the divisor 
into the most significant (NB+1) digits of the dividend to 
obtain a quotient digit q and a partial remainder P.
q
(dNB—1•*d0)r I (cNc-l'•-cNc-NB-l)qD
P
P is always less than N so the next step uses 
P*r + cNc_NB_2 / where r is the radix, as the dividend. The 
result of this is to shift P left by one digit and to add 
the next most significant digit of the dividend to it. 
This is similar to the shift in the previous shift and 
subtract method.
The difficulty arises in finding the quotient digit q. 
This can not be obtained directly as it involves a 
multiple precision division. An approximation to q, call 
it qa, can be obtained from the leading digits of the 
divisor and the dividend. Thus
qa = int cNc-lb + cNc-2 
dNB-l
where int denotes the integer part of. If qa is larger 
than r it can be replaced by (r-1) , the largest single 
digit number. The accuracy of this approximation to q will 
determine how useful the method is. KNUTH(x pp. 255-260) 
shows that if the dividend is first normalised so that its 
most significant digit is greater than half the radix then
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qa will always be greater than q but never more than two 
greater i.e
q qa ^ q+2 ( if cNc_i > int (r/2) )
The trial quotient can thus be obtained by dividing a 
double digit number by a single digit number to obtain a 
single digit approximation qa . Many microprocessors 
include such an instruction in their instruction set but 
unfortunately the MC6809 does not. This is not a great 
disadvantage as such a division can be carried out rapidly 
using the shift and subtract method described previously. 
When qa is calculated it is multiplied by the divisor N 
and subtracted from the dividend.
The complete algorithm is thus :
1. Normalise: Ensure that the most significant digit of 
the divisor is greater than half the radix. Multiply 
the dividend by the same factor. This can be 
accomplished by:
Note that although the normalisation will not affect 
the quotient it will affect the remainder and as it 
is the remainder which is important in this 
application the result will have to be denormalised.
2. Initialise : set a pointer i=Nc-l, the most 
significant digit of the dividend.
3. Calculate trial quotient qa . This is obtained from 
the most significant digits of the dividend and the 
divisor.
*N,
qa = int
Cib + Cj__]_ 
dNB-l
4. Test qa . Determine if qa is too large. The following 
test is a quick method of determining if qa is too 
large. It will determine all cases when qa is two
greater than q and most of the cases when qa is one 
greater than q.
if qadNB-2 > (cib+ci_1) - qad^jB-! r + C i _3 
then
<3a = ^a-1
5. Calculate partial remainder. Multiply qa by N and 
subtract from most significant digits of C.
P i = (c i * • *c i-NB) " 3aN
The partial remainder can be stored in the most
significant digits of C i.e.
(c i • • • c^-Ng) — Pi
6. Restore. If qa is one greater than q and is not 
detected by step (4) Pj_ will be negative. Reduce qa
by one and restore the partial remainder by adding N
to it.
Pi = Pi+N
7. Decrement pointer i. Repeat steps (3) to (7) until 
i = n b
8. Denormalise the remainder to obtain the required 
result. The remainder is stored in the Ng least 
significant digits of C.
A flow chart describing this algorithm is shown in 
Fig.(3.3a). The algorithm was implemented on the MC6809 
microprocessor and the run time was as follows:
Td2 = 827 + 561Ng + (Nc-Ng+1) ^701 + 103(Nc-Ng)J
Again as in the previous case if Nq = 2Ng the total worst 
case run time is:
Td2 = 1528 + 1365(Ng) + 103(Ng)2 cycles
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A table and graph showing the division time for varying 
block lengths is shown in Fig. (3.3b). The time taken to 
divide numbers in the 40 to 80 digit range is from 200ms 
to 800ms.
3.3.3 Division using reciprocals.
If the reciprocal of a number can be found then a quotient 
can be formed by taking the reciprocal of the divisor and 
multiplying the result by the dividend.
Dividend 
quotient = ---------
Divisor
This method is especially useful when the divisor is 
common to many multiplications. In this case the divisor 
can be precalculated thus saving time. In the RSA method 
the divisor which is the modulus N will remain constant 
throughout the exponentiation process which will require 
many modular multiplications and thus divisions by N. Two 
methods of obtaining an approximation to the reciprocal of 
a number were considered. These are :
1. Divide 2^ by the number N, whose reciprocal is 
required, to get a K place approximation to 1/N. The 
division in this case can be carried out by any means 
available such as the shift and subtract method 
described previously or KNUTHs algorithm. The binary 
point is assumed to be to the left of the most 
significant bit.
2 .  Newtons Method.
This requires some initial approximation X q  to the 
reciprocal 1/N and then to use the iterative algorithm:
X j + 1  =  2 X j  -  D X j 2
Dividend 1
*  _______________
Divisor
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This algorithm converges rapidly, at a quadratic rate, 
to 1/N if the initial approximation to 1/N was 'good'.
If X q is not sufficiently close to 1/N the method may 
converge only slowly, if at all.
The speed of the algorithm chosen to calculate the
reciprocal is not a limiting factor as it will only be 
calculated once per exponentiation. The first method was 
chosen using the shift and subtract division algorithm as 
it avoids the problem of convergence and it had already
been coded.
The implementation of the shift and subtract 
reciprocal algorithm on the MC6809 is essentially the same 
as that of the division programme with the exception that
in this case it is the quotient and not the remainder that
is of interest and this must be stored. The flowchart for 
this algorithm is thus the same as for the division 
programme and can be seen in Fig. (3.2a) . The time required 
to calculate the reciprocal is:
Tr  = 1447 + 174(Nc) + 424(Nc )2 cycles.
where Nc is the number of bytes in the dividend. Having 
calculated the reciprocal it is necessary to find the 
quotient and the remainder. The product C*N-1 needs to be
calculated. As C is typically 2NB bytes long and N -1 is NB
bytes long this would involve a long multiplication 
yielding a result of 3 (NB ) bytes in length. This level of 
accuracy is not required, only integer accuracy is 
necessary, thus the multiplication can be considered as 
the multiplication of two (NB ) byte numbers. This product 
should then be multiplied by the divisor N and subtracted 
from C to obtain the remainder. Two multiple precision 
multiplications are performed.
This algorithm, a flow chart of which is shown in 
Fig.(3.4a), was implemented on the MC6809 microprocessor. 
The run time of the algorithm is :
Tj}3 = 240 + 101 (Nb ) + 2 (T^uit [Nb ] ) cycles.
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where NB is the number of bytes in the divisor, N, and
TMultfNB^ the time taken to multiply two NB byte
numbers to form a 2 (NB ) byte product using the algorithm
described previously. A table showing the run time for
various lengths of operands is shown in Fig.(3.4b).
3.4 BLAKELYS ALGORITHM.
The methods discussed so far have performed the
modular multiplication in two steps. The first step 
multiplied the two operands together forming a double
length product. This product was then reduced by dividing 
it by the modulus and keeping the remainder. It is
possible to perform the modular multiplication directly
and an algorithm to do this was described by BLAKELY(9).
Blakelys algorithm is similar to the conventional 
bitwise integer multiplication algorithm. In this method 
the following steps are carried out:
1. Initialise the result to zero.
2. Test the most significant bit of the first operand.
If it is one add the second operand to the result.
3. Shift the result one bit to the left.
4. Repeat for successively less significant bits of the 
first operand. Stop when all the bits have been 
tested.
The modular multiplication algorithm developed by Blakely 
modifies this basic algorithm to provide modular 
multiplication. To do this it is necessary to test the 
result after every addition or left shift. If the result 
is greater than the required modulus subtract the modulus 
from the result and continue. The reduction is thus 
performed along with the multiplication. The algorithm is 
therefore:
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1. Initialise the result to zero.
2. Test the most significant bit of the first operand.
If it is one add the second operand to the result.
3. If the result is greater than the modulus N subtract 
N from the result.
4. Shift the result to the left by one bit.
5. If the result is greater than N, subtract N from the
result.
6. Repeat steps 2 to 6 for successively less significant 
bits of the first operand. Stop when all the bits 
have been tested.
A flowchart of this algorithm appears in Fig. (3.5a). A 
programme utilising this algorithm was written for the 
MC6809 and the run time is given as follows:
TB = 66 + 197(NB ) + 768(NB )2 cycles.
where NB is the number of bytes in the modulus. A table
showing the run time of this programme for various values 
of Nb is given in Fig. (3.5b) .
3.5 ENCRYPTION TIME.
Various methods for performing modular multiplication 
have been described. It is now necessary to determine 
overall encryption times using each of these methods. The 
encryption algorithm is of the form :
C = Me Mod N
C is the required ciphertext, M is the plaintext, e is the 
encryption key and N is the modulus. The length of C,M,e,N 
will be Nb bytes where NB is of the order of 40 bytes or
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more. The exponentiation algorithm has a run time of
Te = 53 + 2583(Nb ) + 2432(NB )2 + 3 2 (NB )TM o d [NB ] cycles
where TM o d [NB ] is the time required to form the product of 
two Nb byte numbers modulo a third NB byte number. Four 
methods of calculating such a product have been discussed:
A. Methods which form the product and then reduce.
These all multiply using the same algorithm but 
reduce modulo N in different ways.
1. Reduction using division by repeated shifting and 
subtracting.
2. Reduction using division by KNUTHs algorithm.
3. Reduction using reciprocals.
B. Methods which reduce as the product is being 
calculated.
4. BLAKELYS Algorithm
For the first three methods the time required for a 
modular multiplication is the combination of the time 
required for a conventional multiplication plus the time 
for the reduction plus any overheads that are necessary. 
For the methods described above the total time for a 
modular multiplication is:
1. Shift and subtract 
Overheads : 96
TmulttNB] : 62 + 67 (%) + 49(Nb )2
Td1 : 2462 + 1326(NB ) + 1192(NB )2
Tmodl = 2620 + 1393(Nb ) + 1241(NB )2
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2. Reciprocal
Overheads : 96
T m u l t W  : 62 + 67 (Nb ) + 49 (Nb ) 2
Td2 : 1528 + 1365(NB ) + 103(NB )2
Tmod2 = 1686 + 1432(Nb ) + 152(NB )2
3. KNUTHs algorithm
Overheads : 96
Tmult[^B ] : 62 + 6 7 (NB ) + 49(NB )2
Td3 : 240 + 101(NB ) + 2*Tmult[NB ]
Tmod3 = 522 + 302(Nb) + 147(NB )2
4. BLAKELYS algorithm.
Tmod4 <=TB> = 66 + 197(Nb ) + 7 68(NB )2
Using these results in the equation for exponentiation 
will give the overall encryption time for each of the 
methods outlined. The results of this are shown in 
Fig. (3.6) .
3.6 OBSERVATIONS
With reference to the table in Fig.(3.6) it can be 
seen that the fastest way of encrypting is to use the 
reciprocal method when performing modular multiplications. 
This is followed closely by Knuths algorithm and then by 
the shift and subtract and Blakelys algorithm. In their 
original paper Rivest, Shamir and Adleman recommend using 
key lengths of 200 decimal digits or approximately 80 
bytes. From the table it can be seen that the time taken 
to encrypt a message of this length is 40 minutes. This 
implies a bit rate of 1/4 bps. If keys of lengths of 100 
decimal digits or 40 bytes are used the encryption time 
reduces to 321 seconds or a bit rate of about 1 bps. This 
may be of use in a limited number of applications but as a 
general purpose encryption device it is of no value.
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3.7 POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS.
There are three possible solutions to the speed 
problem of the microprocessor based encryption unit which 
will be considered.
(1) Reduce the key length even further.
This may be possible in certain instances but as 
discussed earlier the security of the RSA method relies 
heavily on long key lengths. For medium to high security 
applications the key cannot be reduced below 100 decimal 
digits without compromising the security of the system.
(2) Find a more efficient algorithm.
More efficient algorithms have been suggested most of 
which have been based on the Chinese Remainder Theorem. 
These methods e.g (13), will decrease the encryption time 
by a factor of four at best. These algorithm could be 
implemented on a fast 16 or 32 microprocessor thus 
increasing the speed further. However the size of the 
necessary reduction in encryption time, a bit rate of 1000 
bps at least is required, suggests that a software 
solution on its own is not possible.
(3) Implementing the system in hardware.
Several options are available under this heading. The 
addition of hardware multipliers and/or accumulators to 
the existing microprocessor is one alternative. The 
implementation of the complete system in hardware is 
another alternative. This approach offers the best 
possibility of considerably reducing the encryption time 
of the system. The parallelism inherent in the enciphering 
algorithm can best be taken advantage of in hardware. The 
use of semicustom or full custom integrated circuits could 
also reduce the physical size of the system. This approach 
will be dealt with in more detail later.
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A =  (a ,.!  ... o0)
B =  (b,_, ... b0)
C =  (c it i- i  ... Co) 
P =  (Pm , PI)
Variables :
A : Multiplier
B : Multiplicand
C : Result
P : Partial result
t : No. of bytes in A
s : No. of bytes in B
P m : MS byte of P 
PI : LS byte of P 
i,j : Pointers
(3 .1 a ) Multiple precision binary m ultiplication
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Operand Length (Bytes)
Fig (3.1b) Multiple percision binary multiplication
- runtime
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( Stort 3
Variables :
C : Dividend =  ( c m_ ,... c o) 2
N : Divisor =  (d  B_ i... d ^ 2
m : No. of bits in dividend C
n : No. of bits in divisor N
i : pointer
C =  C Mod N
Fig. (3 .2 a )  Shift and su b tract algorithm
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Key Length (Bytes)
1: Division usin^ shift and subtract
2: Modular multiplication
(multiplication + division)
Fig. (3.2b) Shift and subtract algorithm
- runtime
f
Q ° r t  )
N orm alise  
C. N
Initialise  
i -  Nc - 1
. _ (
■Q
' \ ? /  
1 N
C alcu late
9 a
<?„ -  r - 1
T est
^ 0
T0
 
ct1aCT
/  too Y
R esu lt -
( CNB-1 c o>
C End )
 _ N _
C o lcu lo te
p a rtia l
remainder
k
0 ?  /  
Y
Add b a ck  
C -  C+N
1OCT
‘’ a " '
Variables :
C : Dividend =  (c Nc_ , .. c0 ) 
N : Divisor =  ( d ^ . .  d0) 
Nc : No. of bytes in C 
Ng : No. of bytes in N 
q : Trial quotient 
i : Pointer 
r : Radix (= 2 5 6 )
C =  C Mod N
Fig. (3 .3 a )  Knuths division algorithm
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Key Length (Bytes)
1: Reduction (Division 
2: Modular Multiplication
Fig. f.3. 3b) Runtime of Jfnut,hs~a.lgor,ithm
55
(stort )
C =  C Mod N =  C -  int [-£ •] .N
Voriobles :
N : Divisor =  ( d ^ . ,  ..d0) NB : No. of bytes in divisor
C : Dividend =  (c Nc_, ..c 0) Nq : No. of bytes in dividend
N 1 : Reciprocal of divisor T : Tem porary variable
Fig. (3 .4 a )  Division by reciprocals
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Key Length (Bytes)
1: Calculation of reciprocal
2: Multiplication + Division
3: Division
Fig. (3.4b) Division by reciprocals
A = (o,_, ...Qo)
B =  (b ,_ ,  ...bo)
C = (c ,*,.) ...c0)
A : Operand 1 
B : Operand 2 
C : Result
t : No. of bits in A
s : No. of bits in B
i : Pointer
C =  AB Mod N
F ig .(3 .5a ) Blakelys algorithm
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Key Length (Bytes)
Fig. (3.5b) Runtime of Blakelys algorithm
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Key Length (Bytes)
1: Shift' and subtract
2: Reciprocal
3: Knuths algorithm
4: Blakelys algorithm
I f j -
Fig. (3.6bi) °Eneryptiort times
Key Length Method Method Method Method
(Bytes) 1 2 3 4
8 24 3 6 17
10 45 6 10 31
12 76 10 16 52
14 119 16 24 80
16 176 23 33 118
18 248 32 45 165
20 338 43 59 223
22 448 57 76 293
24 578 73 96 378
26 732 92 120 476
28 911 114 146 591
30 1117 139 176 723
32 1352 168 211 873
34 1618 200 249 1042
36 1917 236 292 1232
38 2250 277 339 1443
40 2620 322 391 1678
42 3029 371 448 1937
44 3478 426 510 2221
46 3969 485 578 2531
48 4504 550 652 2869
50 5086 620 731 3236
52 5715 696 817 3633
54 6395 778 910 4061
56 7126 867 1009 4522
58 7911 961 1115 5016
60 8752 1062 1228 5545
62 9651 1171 1348 6109
64 10608 1286 1476 6711
66 11628 1408 1612 7351
68 12710 1538 1756 8031
70 13858 1676 1909 8751
72 15072 1822 2070 9513
74 16356 1976 2239 10318
76 17711 2139 2418 11167
78 19138 2310 2606 12061
80 20640 2490 2804 13003
Method 1 : Shift and subtract
Method 2 : Reciprocal
Method 3 : Knuths algorithm
Method 4 : Blakelys algorithm
Fig. (3.6b) Encryption Times
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4. Key Generation
4.1 INTRODUCTION
Like many cipher systems the security of the RSA 
public key cipher is not absolute. The security of the 
system relies on the necessity for large computational 
resources to break the cipher. This is called computational 
security. To evaluate the level of security provided by the 
system it is necessary to estimate the computational 
resources required to defeat it. If these resources are 
excessive then the system can be considered secure. As will 
be seen later the RSA cipher allows the user to define the 
level of security required for a particular application .
4.2 SECURITY OF THE RSA CIPHER
The security of the RSA cipher is entirely dependent 
on the decryption key. An eavesdropper who obtains this 
key will be able to decrypt any messages sent to the keys 
owner. It is also possible for the eavesdropper to pose as 
the owner in any transactions with a third party. In the 
RSA cipher the encryption key (e,N) is made public and the 
decryption key (d,N) is kept secret. The eavesdropper thus 
has access to all the key parameters except d. The 
decryption key d is related to the encryption key e by the 
following relationship:
ed =  1 (mod ¡6 (N) )
where 0 (N) is the Euler totient function of the encryption 
modulus N. To calculate d it is thus necessary to know 
0 (N) . Other methods of obtaining d e.g by a direct search 
of the keyspace, can be prevented by choosing d uniformly 
from a large enough set. The Euler totient function of N is 
the number of integers less than N and relatively prime to 
N. In this case as discussed previously N is the product of 
two prime numbers p and q and thus ^T(N) is equal to 
(p-1)(q-1) i.e
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N = pq => 0 (N) = (p-1)(q—1) for p,q prime.
The cryptanalyst must therefore find the prime factors p,q 
of N to obtain £f(N). Other methods of calculating the Euler 
totient function without knowing p and q may be possible 
but RIVEST, SHAMIR and ADLEMAN show that any such method is 
equivalent in complexity to factoring N. An attack on the
cipher can thus be reduced to the problem of finding the
prime factors of N. Note that while it is believed that 
this is the case this hypothesis has not been proven and a 
method may be found which has a complexity less than that 
of factoring. The RSA cipher has however withstood attempts 
to find such a method since its proposal and thus the
possibility of finding such a method is remote.
4.3 CHOICE OF KEY SIZE
A large number of algorithms exist for finding the prime 
factors of a number, n, . A detailed discussion of many 
of these algorithms is given in KNUTH(8). The fastest known 
algorithm, is attributed to SCHROEPPEL (12.) and has a run
time of order :
( In(In(n))/In(n) )1/2
n
If n = 10K , where K is an integer, then the run time is of 
the order of :
(K(In(2.3K))/2.3)1/2
10
where n is the number to be factored. The size of n can 
thus determine the computational resources necessary to 
defeat the cipher. In their original paper Rivest, Shamir 
and Adleman recommend choosing N to be of the order of 200 
decimal digits. The time required to factor numbers of this 
size is 3.8 x 10^ years, at 1 microsecond per instruction. 
This provides a large safety margin for increases in the 
speed and efficiency of the algorithms.
The choice of the key size also affects the time required 
for encryption and decryption. Keys of 200 decimal digits
63
may not be required in many cases and smaller keys would 
allow faster encryption times. For example if the key 
length was reduced to 100 digits, the factoring time is
reduced to 74 years and the encryption time is reduced from
46 minutes to 6 minutes (see Fig.3.11). The level of 
security provided by the cipher and hence the transmission 
speed can be chosen to suit the application.
4.4 CHOICE OF PRIMES.
Although finding the prime factors of a number is very 
time consuming in the worst case, a bad selection of p and 
q may undermine the security of the cipher by allowing 
algorithms to exploit properties of the primes. Certain 
choices of primes will allow the cipher to be broken by 
repeated enciphering (NORRIS and SIMMONS), i.e :
E (E (E (....... E (M) )____ ) = M
where the number of encryptions required is relatively 
small ( 0(10^) ). This form of attack can be countered by
choosing p and q to be safe primes, i.e
p = 2px + 1
q = 2q1 + 1
where p,pi,q,qi are odd primes. Other forms of attack are 
also feasible if p and q are not carefully chosen (BLAKELY 
and BLAKELY).
To protect against these and other forms of attack KNUTH 
recommends that the following conditions should be met by 
the primes :
1. p and q should not be the same length but should 
differ by a few digits.
2. The numbers (p-1) and (q-1) should both have large 
prime factors.
3. The greatest common divisor of (p-1) and (q-1) should 
be small.
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In addition to these three guidelines it is also 
recommended that p+1 and q+1 should not consist of small 
prime factors. KNUTH suggests the following procedure for 
choosing primes :
1. Generate a random number r^, with 80 or 81 digits.
2. Search for the first prime number p^ greater than r-j_.
3. Choose another random number r2 with approximately 40
digits.
4. Search for the first prime number, p, greater than r2
which •.
kpi + 1
where k>p2, k is even and k = p^ (Mod 3). This prime, 
which will have around 120 digits, can be used in 
the key. A similar process can be used to find q.
Before implementing the above algorithm it is necessary to 
discuss ways of generating large random numbers and 
procedures for testing numbers for primality.
4.5 GENERATION OF RANDOM NUMBERS.
To generate truly random numbers it would be necessary 
to monitor a random event, such as the tossing of a coin or 
the throwing of a dice, for a fixed period of time. This 
approach is not practical, nor is it really necessary, for 
most applications. The requirement in most case is to 
produce a sequence of numbers which appear random. These 
sequences, called psuedo-random sequences, must fulfill two 
criteria. The first is that the sequence should not repeat 
itself for a long time and the second is that the terms of 
the sequence should be uniformally distributed over a given 
interval.
The algorithm used for the generation of a sequence of 
random numbers is known as the linear congruential method. 
In this method the next random number R^+i is determined 
from the present number R-j_ using the relationship :
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Ri+1 = (aR^ + b) Mod m
where the numbers a, b and m, known as the multiplier, 
increment and modulus respectively are carefully chosen. 
The initial seed number R q  has also to be chosen. The 
maximum sequence length obtainable is the modulus, m, but 
this will only be obtained if the following criteria 
(KNUTH) are adhered to :
1. The increment, b, should be relatively prime to the 
modulus, m, i.e gcd(b,m) = 1.
2. The number (a-1) should be a multiple of every prime 
factor of m i.e if
m = P !XP2yP3Z 
where Pi/P2/P3 are prime x,y,z are integers then 
a = kpip2p 3
where k is an integer. In the simplest case where 
m = p^p2p 3 then a = km.
3. If the modulus, m, is a multiple of 4 then the 
increment b must also be a multiple of 4 i.e if 
m = 0 (Mod 4) then b =. 0 (Mod 4) .
Once the initial choice of parameters have been chosen the 
linear congruential generator is readily implemented in a 
high level language. A random number generator of this form 
was implemented in FORTRAN on the VAX. A flowchart showing 
the programme used to generate the parameters a,b,m is 
shown in Fig. (4.1) .
4.6 PRIMALITY TESTING
To determine if a number is prime it is necessary to show 
that it has no factors except itself and one. This is 
equivalent to the factoring problem on which the security 
of the RSA cipher lies and is thus impractical. However 
there are methods for determining, with high probability, 
if a number is prime or not. These algorithms will, in some 
instances indicate that a number is prime when it is 
composite. The probability of this occuring can be reduced
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by sucessive iterations . A detailed discussion of 
primality testing is given in KNUTH( 8).
The basis of many of the 'probabilistic' primality tests 
resides in Fermats theorem which states that :
aP“l (Mod p) = 1
where p is prime and a is any integer that is not a 
multiple of p. If the number, p, is composite then the 
above relationship may still hold for various values of a. 
To determine, with high probability, that p is prime it is 
necessary to ensure that the above equation hold for many 
different values of a.
Calculation of the above test requires modular
exponentiation and its complexity is thus of the same order 
as encryption and decryption using the RSA cipher. To 
increase the speed of the test, by reducing the size of the 
exponent, SOLOVAY and STRASSEN (15) proposed the following 
modification. To test a number p for primality, an integer, 
a,is chosen randomly from the range 1 < a < p-1. If p
is prime then it will satisy the following conditions :
1. a and p are relatively prime i.e gcd(a,p) = 1
2. J(a/p) Mod p = a (P“l)/2 Mod p
wher J(a/p) is the Jacobi symbol(5). The propability of a 
composite number passing the above tests is 1/2, the test 
must therefore be repeated a number of times to reduce the 
probability that p is composite to acceptable limits. If p
passes the test H times then the probability that p is
composite is 1/2H . Repeating the test 100 times (H=100), as 
recommended by RIVEST, SHAMIR and ADLEMAN, would reduce the 
probability that p is composite to negligible levels
(1/2100).
This algorithm for testing prime numbers was implemented
in FORTRAN on a VAX, according to the flowchart shown in
Fig. (4.2)
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4.7 GENERATING KEYS.
Suitable procedures for generating random numbers and for 
testing numbers for primality have been discussed. A key 
generation scheme based on these procedures, and using 
KNUTHs recomendations will now be given. It is first 
necessary to decide on the key length. This will affect the 
security of the cipher and the time required for 
encryption. A value in the range 100 to 200 decimal digits 
is recommended (4) . The following steps should then be 
taken.
1. Chose two prime numbers p and q using the procedure 
described in section 4.4.
2. The modulus N is the product of p and q i.e N = pq.
3. Choose an encryption (or decryption) key e that is 
relatively prime to ^(N) i.e gcd ( e,;gf(N)) = 1. This can be 
done by generating a random number using the method of 
section 4.5 and testing that it is relatively prime to 0 (N) 
using Euclids(8) algorithm. If it is not relatively prime 
to P'(N) another random number can be generated. This is the 
users public key and it can be inserted in the public 
directory.
4. Calculate the decryption key, d, as the multiplicative 
inverse of e modulo ^f(N) i.e
ed = 1 (Mod ^(N) )
This equation can be solved for d using Euclids algorithm. 
This number is the secret key of the user and steps should 
be taken to ensure that it remains secret.
A flowchart for the above key generation scheme is shown 
in Fig. 4.3. This flowchart was implemented in FORTRAN on a 
V a x .
4.9 EFFECT OF KEY GENERATION ON ENCRYPTION.
The runtime of the key generation algorithm described 
above was of the order of 10 to 20 minutes for keys in the
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100 digit range on a VAX 11/7 80. The time required on a 
personal computer would be larger. The effect of this time 
on the overall encryption/decryption process is not 
significant as the key is only calculated once per user. 
However in some applications short keys (<100 digits) are 
used with frequent changing of keys. In this case the time 
required to calculate the keys becomes significant and will 
affect the overall efficiency of the unit. To overcome this 
problem a number of keys could be generated by a powerful 
computer, such as a VAX, and downloaded to the encryption 
device (a personal computer or dedicated device) on a 
regular basis. This would remove the need for the 
encryption device to calculate the keys but would increase 
the problem of key management.
4.10 MICROPROCESSOR IMPLEMENTATION.
Implementaion of the key generation scheme on a
microprocessor is feasible but suffers from the same
limitations as the use of a personal computer i.e that of
speed. Frequent changing of the keys unless carried out 
during some idle period (e.g at night) would be too time 
consuming. The use of a dedicated microprocessor to 
generate the keys and to perform encryption and decryption 
offers security advantages in that the secret key need 
never leave the microprocessor and would thus be unknown to 
everyone, including the user.
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a : Multiplier k : Integer chosen so that
b : Increm ent kP1P2+1 (Mod 4 ) =  M (Mod 4)
M : Modulus if M (Mod 4 ) =  0
x : A rbitrary integer >  2
R =  (aR +  b) Mod M[+i ' i '
Fig. (4 .1 ) Random Number generator -P a ra m e te rs
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PRIMETEST
p : Number which is to be tested for prlm olity
i : No. of iterations (probability of p being com posite)
a : Random number in the range [0 , p -1 ]
t1, t2  Tem porary variables
J (a /p )  Jacobi symbol (see text)
Fig. (4 .2 )  Prim ality Testing
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FINDKEY SAFEPRIME
p,q : Sofe primes generated using Knuths procedure
N : Encryption modulus.
e : Users public encryption key
d : Users secret decryption key
0 (N ) : Euler totient function of N, 0 (N ) =  (p —1 ) (q —1)
Fig. (4 .3 )  Key Generation Scheme
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5. Hardware Multiplication
The implementation of the RSA public key cipher using 
a standard unassisted 8 bit microprocessor and several 
software algorithms has been discussed in chapters 2 and
3. It has been shown that the encryption time i.e the time 
required to perform modular exponentiation using these 
algorithms is too slow by several orders of magnitude for 
a practical general purpose encryption device. To achieve 
the necessary increase in speed it is necessary to 
consider ways of implement at ing part or all of the 
encryption algorithm in hardware. Several ways of doing 
this were considered :
1. Addition of arithmetic co-processor to the 
microprocessor.
2. Use of dedicated hardware multipliers to assist 
microprocessor.
Arithmetic co-processors are available for most 
standard microprocessors. These co-processors perform 
arithmetic functions and pass the results to the main 
processor. These processors are usually optimised for 
floating point operations. The use of a coprocessor in 
modular exponentiation causes the same problems as the use 
of the unassisted microprocessor namely that of word 
length. The word length recommended for the RSA public key 
cipher is of the order of 400 bits. Commercially available 
arithmetic coprocessors can not deal directly with word 
lengths of this size and they cannot be cascaded. The cost 
of these coprocessors rules them out for many
applications.
A dedicated hardware multiplier is a device which 
performs only multiplication, unlike the arithmetic co­
processor which can perform many other arithmetic 
functions. These multipliers deal mainly with signed or 
unsigned binary integers. The use of these devices in many 
aspects of digital signal processing has produced a wide
5.1 INTRODUCTION
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variety of such devices.
5.2 HARDWARE MULTIPLIERS
Hardware multipliers perform multiplication using the 
'shift and add' algorithm that was discussed previously. 
Consider two operands :
A =  (an_!,an_2,..... al,a0>2
B =  <bm-l'bm-2,.....b l,b 0>2.
where a^ and b^ are binary digits. The product A  * B is 
given by :
C = A*B = (an_lf......alraQ)2 * (bm -l'...... b l'b 0>2.
n-1 m-1
<E aiZ1 > < E  bj2j >
i=0 j=0
n-1 m-1
E  E  2 ± + j
i=0 j=0
thus C is the shifted sum of the partial products aj_bj  # The 
bitwise multiplication of binary digits is equivalent to 
logical AND. Multipliers can be divided into three 
categories which describe the way in which they implement 
the above expression :
1. Serial Multipliers.
2. Serial/Parallel Multipliers.
3. Parallel Multipliers.
5.2.1 Serial Multipliers
In a serial multiplier the operands are input to the device 
serially i.e one bit at a time. A diagram for a typical 
serial adder is shown in Fig. (5.1). It consists of a 
logical AND gate, a full adder with carry feedback and a
temporary n bit storage register, R = (rn-1 rg) . The
AND gate forms the bitwise product of aj_bj ^ This is added 
to least significant bit of the temporary storage 
register, rl, and shifted to form the new partial product.
74
Thus
and
rk = rk+l 0 C K s< n-1
where is the input carry bit. The result is obtained by 
clocking out the least significant bit of register R every 
mth ci0ck cycle.
n-1 m-1
C = Y. 2i <ai Z b j2j > 
i=0 j=0
Now the contents of register R at time i are:
m-1
Ri = aj_ ^  bj2^
j=0
therefore
n-1
c - Y. 2i Ri
i=0
This is most easily seen in an example. Consider A = 
(10110) and B = (1011)2- The steps required to multiply
these integers and the contents of the partial result 
register at each step is shown in Fig.(5.2). As can be seen 
the time required to multiply an n bit number by an m bit 
number is m*n clock cycles. The maximum clock speed is 
determined by the carry propagation delay Tc .
5.3.2 Serial/Parallel Multiplier
In a serial/parallel multiplier one of the operands is 
presented to the device in serial form, the other is 
presented in parallel form. There are two possible ways of 
implementing such a multiplier :
1. Horners method.
2. Right to left factorisation method.
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5.3.2.1 Homers Method
In Horners method the product C = A*B, can be written as:
This can be expanded in the form :
C = ( (. . ( an_ iB) 2 + an_2B) 2 + .... ) 2 + a]_B) 2 + agB 
The partial product P-^  can be defined by the recurrence :
It can be seen from the above expression that the result C 
is equal to Pg. A diagram of a circuit to implement this 
recurrence is shown in Fig. (5.3). In this circuit an m bit 
full adder is required. Also as there are n additions, 
there is a possibility of obtaining n carry bits. To 
accomadate this it is necessary to include an n bit half 
adder. Alternatively a m+n bit full adder could be used.
5.3.2.2 Right to Left Factorisation
The right to left factorisation method removes the 
need for a double length i.e (m+n) bit adder. Consider the 
product C = A*B which gives :
n-1
C = £  2iaiB
i=0
Expand this as in Horners method and divide both sides by 
2n_1
C / 2 n _ 1  = a n _ !  + 2 _ 1  ( a n ^ B  + 2 _ 1  ( .  . . + 2 - 1  ( x xB + 2 _ 1 ( a 0 B ) . . )
Again as in Horners method if we define a partial product 
Pj_ by the recurrence :
P - l  = 0,
n-1
i=0
i=n, n-1 3, 2 , 1
76
pi+l = 2 lpi + aiB ' i  =  - 1 /  o ,  1 , , n-1
This result is similar to the Horner method except for the 
order in which it accesses the bits of operand A, from most 
significant (MSB) to least significant (LSB) for Horner and 
from LSB to MSB for this method. However this method has a 
significant advantage in that at any time i, the i least 
significant bits of the result are known. This differs from 
the Horner in which a carry can propagate throughout all 
the bit positions at any time. This allows the use of a 
single length (m bits) adder in the circuit. A diagram of 
such a circuit appears in Fig.(5.4). This consists of m and 
gates, an m bit full adder and a (m+n) bit shift register. 
The operand B is presented to the multiplier in parallel 
form while A is presented one bit at a time. Both of these 
algorithms shift the partial result one bit if a.j_ is 0 and 
add B to the partial result if a-j_ is 1.
5.3.3 Parallel Multiplier
In all of the multipliers described so far at least one 
of the operands is input to the multiplier in serial form. 
However a consideration of the original expression for the 
product C = A*B shows that this is not necessary :
n-1 m-1
C = A*B = Y, 2i + j (aibj)
i=0 j=0
The partial products (aj_bj) can be computed independently 
and summed. From the above expression it can be seen that 
there are (m*n) partial products. It will thus be necessary 
to have (m*n) AND gates and (m*n) adders. A diagram of a 
typical parallel multiplier is shown in Fig. (5.5). It can 
be seen from this that the shift required between partial 
products is produce by physical wiring between adders. As 
both operands are available to the multiplier in parallel 
form the product can be calculated in a single clock cycle.
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5.3 SPEED AND SPACE COMPARISON OF MULTIPLIERS.
The three types of multipliers described above can be 
compared in terms of speed and physical size. The speed of 
the multiplier will be determined in terms of n the number 
of bits in the operands. For the purpose ofthis comparison 
it will be assumed that both operands contain the same 
number of bits.
The serial multiplier is the slowest of the multipliers as 
it takes 0(n2) clock cycles to calculate the product. In 
terms of physical size it is however the smallest as it 
only rquires a single bit adder. The temporary register can 
be implemented using one of the operand registers. The size 
of the multiplier is thus independent of n i.e 0(1) as it 
is assumed that operand registers are always available. The 
maximum clock speed is limited by propagation delays 
within the adder.
The serial/parallel adder can calculate the product in 
0 (n) clock cycles. It is thus significantly faster than the 
serial adder. In terms of space however, it requires an n 
bit full adder, n AND gates and a 2n bit shift register. 
The amount of space required is thus 0 (n) . The maximum 
clock speed usable with this type of multiplier is 
determined by the speed of the adder. The speed of the 
adder is limited by the carry propagation time. To
illustrate this consider the addition of A=(0111)2 and 
B=(0001)2 :
0111 
+ 0001
1000
Addition of the least significant bits produces a carry
into the next bit. This carry when added produces a further 
carry into the next bit, and so on until the most
signifcant bit changes. The value of the most significant 
is thus dependent on the carry produced in the least
significant bit. If the propagation delay is Tp then the 
time required before a valid result is obtained is nTp. 
There are ways of reducing this delay, some of which will
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be described later, however the delay is still a function 
of the number of bits in the adder. The maximum clock speed 
possible with a serial/parallel adder is thus less than 
that of a serial adder and decreases as n increases i.e 
fc(max) 1/n.
The parallel multiplier is the fastest of three types as 
it can calculate the product in a single clock cycle. The 
multiplier however requires n2 AND gates and n2 adder 
elements. The space requirements are therefore 0(n2) while 
the time is limited only by delays within the circuit 
itself. As can be seen from the diagram in Fig. (5.5) the 
maximum propagation delay is 0 (nTp), where Tp is the worst 
case propagation of the adder.
The three type of multipliers therefore represented 
time/space tradeoffs. If speed is of prime importance and 
space is not a problem then the parallel multiplier would 
be chosen. Conversely if speed is not a problem but space 
is the serial multiplier would be the best choice. The 
serial/parallel adder is a compromise. To summarise 
therefore the multipliers can be compared as follows :
Type Delay Time Space
Serial 0(1) 0 (n2) 0(1)
Serial/Parallei 0 (n) 0 (n) 0 (n)
Parallel 0 (n) 0(1) 0 (n2)
where time is in clock cycles and delay is in term of worst 
case adder propagation delay.
5.4 CHOICE OF MULTIPLIER.
To decide on a multiplier it is necessary to consider the 
size of operands that will be required. The use of a 
keylength of 200 decimal digits, or approximately 600 bits, 
is recommended for high security applications. For lower 
levels of security, and consequently higher transmission
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rates, shorter keys i.e 300 bits could be used. The choice 
of multiplier should enable differing levels of security to 
be offered by allowing multipliers to be cascaded to 
produce the bit length, and hence the security level, 
required.
The serial multiplier can easily handle the various bit 
lengths required. As the cost of hardware is independent of 
bit length the cost of such a device would be low. The 
speed of the serial multiplier is 0(n2) and thus woud take 
0(360000) clock cycles to multiply 600 bit numbers, the 
maximum clock speed is limited by the propagation delay of 
the adder. The use of very high speed (>10MHz) clocks, 
however, causes other problems e.g circuit layout becomes 
critical. Thus the clock should be restricted to 10MHz. 
This would result in a time of 0(36mS) for the 
multiplication. The time required to multiply two 600 bit 
numbers using subroutine MULT, described in chapter 3, is 
approximately 300mS. The serial multiplier therefore 
provides a tenfold increase in speed. This is not however 
considered sufficient.
A 600 bit parallel multiplier could produce the result in 
one clock cycle, the propagation delay being 0(1200) adder 
propagation delays. The space requirement for such a 
multiplier is 0(360000) which is excessive. The space, cost 
and power requirements of so many elements renders such a 
multiplier impractical. The parallel multiplier is not 
easily cascaded, to illustrate this consider implementing 
an 8x8 bit parallel multiplier using 4x4 bit multipliers. A 
diagram of the circuit required is shown in FIG.(5.6). As 
can be seen from this figure 4 4x4 bit multipliers, along 
with adders are required. It would therefore not be 
feasible to implement a parallel multiplier for use with 
small key lengths and cascade it for larger keys.
The serial/parallel multiplier offers a compromise in 
terms of speed and size and for this reason it was decided 
to use this type of multiplier. The time required is 0(n)
i.e 0(600) clock cycles. The hardware cost is 0(600) which
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is significantly less than that of a parallel multiplier. 
Serial/parallel multipliers are also easily cascaded to 
produce different word lengths thus allowing the level of 
security to be easily chosen. The delay is greater than 
that of a serial multiplier, thus a slower clock must be 
used. If fast adders were implemented using 'look ahead 
carry' techniques, as shown in Fig. (5.7) a clock of 1MHz 
could be used. This would result in a multiplication time 
of 600uS which is a factor of 500 times greater than 
subroutine MULT.
5.5 MODULAR MULTIPLIERS.
The use of a multiplier to assist in the implementation of 
the RSA public key encryption algorithm would be of greater 
benefit if the multiplier could perform modular 
multiplication directly. The most time consuming element of 
the encryption algorithm is the calculation of the modular 
multiplication A*B mod M. the algorithms described in 
chapter 3, with one exception, calculate this producvt in 
two steps. First the integer multiplication A*B is 
perrformed and then the result is reduced modulo M. Of the 
algorithms described in chapter three only BLAKELYs 
algorithm performed modular multiplication directly.
As mentioned in chapter 2 BLAKELYs algorithm is a 
modification of the 'shift and add' multiplication method. 
Consider the expression for the product of two binary 
integers A and B to form the product C :
Modification of this expression to produce the modular 
product A*B mod M, where M = (mk_i,...., mg) is the 
required modulus and 0 < A,B < M, yields :
n-1
n-1
C (mod M) = A*B (mod M) = ( ^ ] (2;’-aj_B mod M) ) mod M
i=0
8 1
Comparing this to the 'shift and add' algorithm it can be 
seen that it is necessary to reduce each partial product 
modulo M and to add the partial products modulo M. To 
reduce an integer modulo M it is necessary to compare the 
integer to M and if it is greater than M subtract M from it 
i.e if P is the integer then :
P mod M = P, 0 P < M
P mod M = P-M, M P < 2M
Note that if P is reduced after every addition then P is
always less than 2*M. A flowchart detailing BLAKELYs
algorithm, with particular reference to hardware 
implementation is shown in FIG. (5.8) . From this flowchart 
it can be seen that the following hardware is required :
1. An adder
2. Registers to hold, the operands A,B, the
modulus M and the result R.
3. A control unit.
The adder is the main computational unit. It has two input 
operands. One of the operands is the result R, the other is 
either the operand A or the modulus M, the choice being 
governed by the control unit. The modulus register M can 
contain -M, in twos complement form, instead of M. The 
adder will thus be able to perform the calculation R+A or 
R-M, which is all that is required as can be verified by 
the flowchart.
The registers are required to hold the operands and 
intermediate results throughout the calculation. Again it 
can be seen from the flowchart that a shift register is 
required for operand B and result R, whereas a standard 
register will suffice fo operand A, and modulus M.
The control unit implements the sequence of instructions 
described in the flowchart. It requires as inputs the 
operand B and a decision on whether R is greater or less
than M. It controls the adder and the outputs and clocking
of the registers.
A block diagram of the hardware described above is shown
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in FIG. (5.9).
5.6 IMPLEMENTATION.
There are several ways in which the modular multiplication 
device can be implemented. The method chosen will depend on 
cost, ease of implementation and expansion, physical size 
and its ease of integration into the overall encryption 
algrithm. the methods of implementation considered were :
1. Discrete hardware using standard SSI and MSI 
devices.
2. Implementation using bit-slice computer 
techniques.
3. Use of application specific integrated 
circuits (ASICS)
5.6.1 Discrete Hardware
The modular multiplication device can be readily 
implemented using standard integrated circuit building 
blocks. The TTL and CMOS series of logic circuits can 
supply all of the required function blocks e.g adders, 
shift registers, registers etc. The control unit can be 
implemented as a finite state machine using either 
hardwired logic i.e NAND, NOR gates and FLIP-FLOPs, or by 
using programmable devices such as PROMS, PALS etc. The use 
of programmable logic allows the flexibility of changing 
the sequence of operations carried out by the control unit 
should this be required. The disadvantage of this method is 
the space required for its implementation. All of the 
building blocks are seperate devices and thus a large 
number would be necessary to realise the device. The bit 
lengths available with this form of construction are small 
generally being 4 or 8 bits and while the structure is 
cascadable the size would quickly become excessive.
As discussed earlier the major constraint when using 
microprocessors to perform multiplication on large (>100) 
bit numbers is the limited data path, usually 8 or 16 bit
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available to the microprocessor. This necessitates that the 
operands be divided into more manageable size with a 
subsequent reduction in the speed of operation. The core of 
a microprocessor is an arithmetic and logic unit (ALU) 
which performs calculations and input and output registers 
for the storage and shifting of operands and results. On 
any given microprocessor the width of the ALU is 
predetermined and cannot be changed.
5.6.2 Bit Slice Devices
Bit-slice devices however seek to implement a single or 
multiple bit ALU with the possibility for cascading to
produce any desired bit length. Other bit-slice devices are 
available for implementing control sequences. With bit- 
slice devices it would be possible to implement an ALU of 
sufficient length to perform Blakelys algorithm. The 
disadvantage with this approach is similar to that when 
using standard logic building blocks namely that of size. At 
present most bit-slice dvices deal with 4 bit, although 8 
and even 16 bit ¿evices are becoming available but at high 
cost. There are also a number of peripheral devices, such 
as sequencers which are also required. Therefore a large 
number of devices would be required and the cost of the 
completed unit would be large. The bit-slice approach is 
intended mainly for the Aesign of high speed general purpose 
CPUs and as such are generally implemented in TTL or ECL 
technology. The power requirements of a large number of 
such devices would be excessive.
5.6.3 Application Specific Integrated Circuits (ASICS)
The use of semi or full custom integrated circuits 
(ASICS) has a higher initial cost both in terms of design 
time and actual production costs. The advantage however is 
that a circuit can be tailored to suit the needs of the 
encryption device andthe space required should be greatly 
reduced. At present there are three major techniques for 
integrated circuit design:
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1. Gate Arrays Design.
2. Standard Cell Design.
3. Full Custom Design.
The use of Gate Array or Standard Cell design is referred 
to as ' semicustom' design as part of the design work has 
already been carried out by the manufacturer.
5.6.3.1 Gate Array
The Gate Array, also known under various trade names such 
as uncommitted logic array (ULA), consist of a two 
dimensional array of cells. Each cell consist of a number 
of circuit elements e.g. N- anA P channel transistors etc. 
The design process entails connecting these cells up so as 
to perform the required function. This connection is done 
on the metal layer(s) which are not predetermined. As only 
one (or two) layer needs to be designed and the rest of the
i.e. is standard this form of semi-custom circuit is the 
quickest and least expensive to implement. Many software 
design tools are available to aid in this process, many of 
which can take a circuit diagram and generate the masks 
required for the metal layers automatically.
5.6.3.2 Standard Cell
The standard cell approach is essentially similar to 
design using TTL or CMOS building blocks. With this method 
a large number of building blocks are predefined e.g logic 
gates, flip-flops etc. the designer must lay these out on 
the wafer and interconnect them. This is a much more 
difficult process than gate array design as there are many 
variables. The positioning of the cells ani the 
interconnection paths must be determined by the designer. 
The level of software tools available for standard cell 
layout is not as great as for gate array design. The 
advantage of the standard cell over the gate array is that 
denser layout, and hence more functions per wafer, is 
possible using standard cells.
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5.6.3.3 Full Custom
Full custom design requires that the designer designs the 
complete mask set for the wafer using no predefined cells. 
'This is a much more difficult approach than semi-custom as 
it requires a detailed knowledge of i.c design and a large 
amount of time. This method however produces the densest 
layout.
Of the three methods the Gate Array is the least 
expensive and easiest to implement, however it is also the 
least dense of the methods. The standard cell is more 
expensive to design and produce but offers higher density. 
The full custom method is the most expensive to produce but 
offers the highest density.
5.7 CHOICE OF IMPLEMENTATION METHOD.
The choice of implementation method is determined by 
size, cost, and expected volume. The discrete hardware 
approach is the least expensive but requires a large amount 
of space. A bit slice approach is more expensive and the 
amount of space required would compare with the discrete 
approach. The use of dedicated integrated circuits offers 
the best possibility for space reduction but the cost, 
especially in the low volume required for a research 
project, is prohibitive.
When this decision was being considered, the National 
Board of Science and Technology (N.B.S.T.) were offering 
grants to enable researchers avail of the facitilities of 
the National Microelectronics Centre (N.M.R.C.), where full 
custom and semi-custom integrate circuit design is carried 
out. A grant was applied for and granted for the design of 
the modular multiplication device at the N.M.R.C. For this 
reason it wass decided to design a dedicated integrated 
circuit. This process will be described in the next 
chapter.
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D -ty p e
Reg.
A : Multiplier (n bits) Cl : Carry in
B : Multiplicand (m  bits) CO: Carry out
R : Shift Register
Fig. (5 .1 ) Serial Multiplier
Clock B R
Cycle 1
1 0 0 0 0 0
2 1 0 0 0 0
3 1 1 0 0 0
4 0 1 1 0 0
5 1 1 0 1 1 0
6
7
8
9
1 0  0 1 0 0 0 0
11
1 2
13
14
15 1 0 1 0 0 0
16
17
18
19
2 0 1 1 1 1 0
A =  (10110) 
B =  (1011)
0
1 0
0 1 0
0 1 0 Result
Fig. (5 .2 ) Serial Multiplier Example
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_::a
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S2 S1
A: Multiplier (n bits)  
S: Result (m + n  bits)
B: Multiplicand (m  bits) 
FA : Full Adder 
HA: Half Adder
Fig. (5 .3 )  Horners multiplication method
A: Multiplier (n bits) 
S: Result (m  +  n bits)
B: Multiplicand (m  bits) 
FA : Full Adder 
HA: Half Adder
Fig. (5 .4 ) Right to left factorisation
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A : Multiplier =  (a 3.a2.a1(a0)
B : Multiplicand =  ( 63 .62 ,13,,b0)
Fig.(5 .5 )  Parallel Multiplier
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Bm
Am
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Am
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A»B
A -  (Al. A m )
B -  (Bl, B m )
Al : LS nfeble o f A 
Am : MS nibble of A 
Bl : LS nibble o f B 
Bm : MS nibble of B
Fig. (5 .6 )  8x8 bit m ultiplier using 4x4 bit devices
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Variables
A: Operand 1
B: Operand 2
M: Negative of
Modulus
C: Bit Counter
R: Result
B(N): MSB of E
Fig. 5 .8  Modified Blokely algorithm
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R : R esult -  AB Mod M 
C : Bit c o u n te r
Fig. (5 .9 )  Simplified block diagram
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6. Semi-Custom Implementation
6.1 DESIGN CRITERIA
The function of the modular multiplication device (MMD) 
is to perform the modular multiplication required for the 
RSA public key cipher using Blakelys algorithm. The device 
was designed with regard to certain criteria. The first of 
these was that it should interact with the rest of the 
encryption algorithm and to this end an interface to 
standard 8 bit microprocessors was required, the second 
criteria was that the use of different key lengths to 
provide different levels of security was also required. It 
had to be possible, therefore, to easily change the bit 
length that could be used with the MMD.
6.2 DESIGN PROCESS
The design of semi-custom circuits at the NMRC involves a 
number of design stages as shown in Fig. 6.1. The major 
design stages are :
. Concept 
. Block Design
. Logic Design
. Circuit Design 
. Layout 
. Fabrication
These design stages will be discussed in greater detail 
below.
6.2.1 Concept
The first stage of any design work is the concept or idea
stage. In most cases where semi-custom implementation is
considered a circuit has already been designed and 
implemented using standard logic and thus the idea has been 
proven. In other cases where the circuit is to be 
implemented directly on silicon, without a prototype having
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been constructed using standard logic, the idea is not 
proven.
Both of these cases require that at each stage of the 
design process the design is simulated and tested to ensure 
that it meets the requirements placed on it. If a circuit 
has already been prototyped this can be used to predict and 
compare responses obtained from simulation. Circuits which 
are to be implemented without a prototype require that 
results from higher level simulations be used for 
comparison and prediction of how the final circuit will 
behave.
6.2.2 Block Design
The block design requires that the system to be designed 
is broken into a number of functional units, e.g storage, 
interface, computation and control , and that the interface 
between and function of these units is defined. At this 
stage it is necessary to consider how the system can be
divided if it is too large to fit on a single die.
Testing of the block design is carried out using a 
register transfer simulator. This deals with units at a 
functional or logic level. The input to the register
transfer simulator is a description of the circuit written 
in a hardware description language (HDL). These simulators 
are event driven and can therefore not be used for detailed 
timing analysis. They are used to test the validity of the 
design and can also provide test vectors for use in later 
simulation and testing.
6.2.3 Logic Design
The logical design is carried out for each of the
functional units described in the block design. This
involves designing the function units using existing 
logical functions e.g AND, OR and Flip-Flops. There are
many tradeoffs which can be made at this stage. The major 
tradeoff is between size and speed. Implementation of 
functions such as adders or counters using serial
techniques will result in a large saving in space but will
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affect the speed. Similarly if these devices are 
implemented using parallel techniques the speed will 
increase but so too will the physical size of the device. A 
compromise must be reached between the two techniques. The 
result of this stage should be a complete circuit diagram 
at a logic level of each of the function units.
In the design of the modular multiplication device the 
width of the data path, i.e the number of bits that the 
device can handle, was not known at this stage. Because of 
this all function units that were dependent on the data 
path had to be designed on a modular basis to allow easy 
expansion when the size of the data path became known.
Testing of the logical design is carried out using the 
register transfer simulator. This is carried out at two 
levels, the testing of each of the function units 
individually and the testing of the complete device.
6.2.4 Circuit Design
Circuit design is the creation of cells which are 
necessary for the function units. These cells are created 
using elements from the standard cell library available at 
the NMRC. Elements that are not present in the standard 
cell library have to be designed. The cells are designed on 
a bit basis, e.g a one bit shift register , and the inputs 
and outputs to each cell placed so as to allow abbutment 
of cells to produce longer word lengths. Functions which 
are independent of the data path can be designed completely 
at this stage.
The result of this stage is a series of modules, at a 
higher level than the standard cell elements e.g a shift 
register cell or a counter cell, which can be used to 
produce the function units necessary. The size of the data 
path can also be decided at this stage, this will be 
discussed later.
Before testing of the cells can be carried out they must 
first be extracted. The cells consist physical shapes at 
different levels e.g polysilicon, metal and silicon 
dioxide. These shapes must be converted back to electrical 
devices such as resistors and transistors. A programme
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which carries out this function is called an extractor. The 
extractor uses relationships between the different layers 
to deduce the presence of transistors etc. The electrical 
description output by the extractor , which will include 
parisitic capacitances and diodes, will be in a format 
which can then be used as input to a circuit simulator.
Testing of the circuit design is performed using a 
circuit simulator. The two used at the NMRC are SPICE, a 
public domain programme developed at the University of 
California at Berkely, and SIMON, developed and supplied by 
ECAD. Both of these simulators allow detailed timing 
analysis to be carried out. SIMON and SPICE are compatible 
in many ways, they can both accept the same input file. 
However SIMON is optimised for digital logic circuits and 
is considerably faster than SPICE when used on these 
circuits. These simulators provide accurate predictions of 
time delay and waveforms accepted from circuits but they 
are very CPU intensive. The time delay involved in 
simulating circuits of reasonable size is considerable.
Simulation of the circuit design is carried out at two 
levels. The first level is a test of the cell design. The 
second level involves connecting cells to obtain function 
units and simulation of these units
Circuit design of cells can be carried out using an 
interactive layout editor. An example of such an editor is 
KIC2, a public domain product, which is available at the 
NMRC and at N.I.H.E Dublin.
6.2.5 Layout
Layout is the actual physical design of the integrated 
circuit using the cells developed in the previous stage. 
The width of the data path is known at this stage and thus 
the physical size of all the function units can be 
estimated. The first step in the layout process is to 
develop a floor plan. This will show the location of all of 
the function units in the device and the space occupied by 
each of them. Sufficient space must also be left for 
routing of interconnections between the function units. The 
floor plan will be hierarchical in nature in that function
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units will consist of cells which in turn will consist of 
elements from the standard cell library._This provides for 
flexibility in the design of the floor plan as the shape of 
the function units can be changed, by rearranging the cells 
within it, and thus there are many possible floor plans.
When the floor plan has been completed each of the 
function units is constructed from its cells so as to fit 
the space allocated to it. The function units are then 
placed in their appropriate places and interconnections 
between them are made. It is good practice to have all 
inputs and outputs to the function units named as this will 
enable connections to be automatically checked. 
Interconnection is carried out using metal and polysilicon 
layers. Layout is performed on an APPLICON CAD system at 
the NMRC.
Testing of the completed layout on a physical and an 
electrical basis is required. On the physical level it is 
necessary to ensure that the layers and shapes conform to 
the design rules at the NMRC. These design rules specify 
the minimum size of shapes on different layers and the 
minimum distances between shapes. The circuit is tested, to 
ensure that there are no design rule violations, using 
programmes developed at the NMRC.
Electrical testing of the layout is in two forms. The 
first is an electrical rule check which ensures that there 
are no electrical rule violations, e.g power and ground 
rails connected together or signals with different names 
connected to one another. The second is the use of a 
circuit simulator to test the final circuit. Before this 
can be done the circuit must be extracted. The use of 
circuit simulators at this level is very time consuming. 
For this reason emphasis is placed on testing at the 
function unit level and on the electrical rule checker.
The result of this stage is geometrical representation of 
the integrated circuit at different levels.
6.2.6 Fabrication
After the layout has been completed masks are made of the 
different layers. This involves sizing the layout to its
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correct size and making positive or negative masks, as 
appropriate, of each layer. These masks are used in the 
fabrication process. The process used at the NMRC was a 5 
micron CMOS p-well process.
6.3 SYSTEM OVERVIEW
The device can be divided into two main sections, the 
Data path and the Control path. The Data path contains the 
registers for storing the variables , the adder and the 
interface to the microprocessor. The Control path contains 
the control sequence for implementing Blakelys algorithm, 
it should be noticed that the width of the Data path 
depends on n, the keylength while the control path is 
essentially independent of t h i s . ( ^
It was not expected that a modular multiplication device 
of sufficient size (300 bits) would fit on a single 
integrated circuit. It was thus necessary to divide the 
device into sections which could be cascaded to produce the 
complete device. Two options were considered :
1. Separation of Control and Data paths.
2. Master/Slave device.
The first option involved the design of two separate 
integrated circuits, a control circuit and a data circuit. 
The control circuit would contain the finite state machine 
to implement Blakelys algorithm while the Data circuit 
would contain the various registers and adders required. 
Again it was expected that the complete data path could not 
be contained in a single device, so several identical data 
circuits would be required to produce the necessary 
wordlength.
The Master/slave approach differs from the first option 
in that the control and data paths would not be separated. 
Each device would be autonomous, containing its own control 
and data path. As a single device would not be sufficient 
for the keylengths being used these devices could be 
cascaded. When the devices where cascaded the most 
significant device, i.e the device which contained the most
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significant bits of the Data path would be the 'Master', 
all other devices being 'Slaves'. The 'Master' device would 
make all the decisions e.g whether the result was greater
than the modulus, and pass these to the Slaves. There would
be no physical difference between Master and Slave devices, 
each would be selected by the level on an external pin. A 
diagram showing several of these devices cascaded is shown 
in FIG. (6.3). The labels used in this diagram will be 
explained later.
This method was chosen as it does not require that 
different devices be produced. The time and resources 
necessary to produce two different integrated circuits 
could not be justified.
6.3 SYSTEM  DESIGN
The proposed device, shown in FIG. (6.4), consists of
several subunits. These subunits are:
1. Interface unit.
2. Storage unit.
3. Computation unit.
4. Cascade and Master/Slave unit.
5. Control Unit.
The interface unit provides the interface between the 
modular multiplication device and external circuitry. The 
storage unit contains registers to hold the input variables 
required by the device and storage for the result obtained. 
The computation unit performs all the calculations 
necessary to implement Blakelys algorithm. The cascade and 
master/slave unit allows for cascading of modular 
multiplication devices to produce longer wordlengths. The 
control unit is a finite state machine which controls all 
the other hardware in the device to perform Blakelys 
algorithm.
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6.3.1 Interface Unit
The purpose of the interface unit is to allow data to be 
transferred between the modular multiplication device and 
external devices. This interface had to be compatible with 
standard 8 bit microprocessors. The interface consists of 
an address bus, a data bus and a control bus.
The data bus is an 8 bit wide bi-directional tri-state 
bus. Data is loaded into the internal 16 bit registers 8 
bits at a time.
The address bus is an input only port to the device which 
selects the appropriate register and byte within that
register. The size of the address bus is 3 bits. This 
allows the 3 sixteen bit input registers, the sixteen bit 
output register and the 8 bit counter to be addressed. The 
input registers are write-only and the output register is 
read only. The modular multiplication device appears to the 
external microprocessor or other circuitry as a block of 
contiguous memory locations.
The control bus is a collection of control signals 
necessary for the synchronisation of data transfer and for 
proper operation of the device. This bus contains the
clock, the read/write signal, the chip select signal and 
reset.
The diagram of the interface unit is shown in Fig. 6.5. It 
contains an input data selector, an output data selector 
and address decoding. The input and output data selectors 
are provided by means of multiplexors. Address decoding is 
implemented using a 3 to 8 line decoder.
Connections between the device and the external world are
performed by means of input and output buffers. These 
differ from internal buffers in their ability to drive 
large capacitances. The input and output buffers were 
placed around the edge of the integrated circuit.
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6.3.2 Storage Unit
The storage unit contains four registers to hold the 
operands A and B, the modulus M and the result R and also 
the bit counter C.
Registers A and M are simple storage registers with tri­
state output. The outputs of these registers are connected 
to one of the adder input busses.
Register B, also called the control register, is a 
parallel in serial out shift register. The only bit of 
interest in register B is the most significant bit which is 
used by the control algorithm to select between two 
alternative actions.
Registers A,B and M are loaded from the external circuitry 
via the interface unit.
The result register R is a parallel in parallel out shift 
register. Register R is loaded from the output of the 
adder. The output of the R register provides the second 
operand for the adder. It can also be read by external 
circuitry via the interface unit. It must also be possible 
to clear register R when required.
The bit counter C is an 8 bit down counter. It is loaded 
by the microprocessor with the keylength. This is then used 
by the control algorithm to determine the number of 
iterations of the control algorithm necessary. The counter 
is decremented by the control unit at each iteration until 
it is zero. The output from the counter is a signal which 
indicates to the control unit that it has reached zero.
Registers A, B and M and counter C appear as write only 
memory location to the external microprocessor. Register R 
appears as read only. The microprocessor can not, 
therefore, read the contents of A, B or M and cannot write 
to R.
Logic Design
As the width of the data path was not known the design of 
the storage unit was accomplished on a modular basis. 
Single bit registers and counters were designed so that 
they could be linked together to form longer wordlengths.
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A logic diagram of a simple register cell used to 
implement registers A and M is shown in Fig. 6.6a. The 
register used is a standard level triggered D-type.
The circuit design of the A and M registers was 
complicated by the lack of a tri-state buffer in the cell 
library at the NMRC. This was developed by the NMRC for 
this application. The circuit design of registers A and M 
is shown in Fig. 6.6b. The basic cell consists of three 
standard cells, a D-type register, a tri-state buffer and a 
via. The via is included to allow the data bus to pass 
through the register and onto other registers. There are 
control signals for reseting and loading the register and 
and for enabling the output buffers. The register cells 
were stacked together to form the complete registers.
The shift register cell used for registers R and B is 
shown in Fig. 6.7a. These cells are fully synchronous in 
operation. Connection of these cells to form longer 
registers requires that an extra circuit, which provides 
the control signals, is added for every 8 cells. A logic 
diagram of this circuit is shown in Fig. 6.8a.
The shift register cell is shown in Fig. 6.7b. the use 
of multiplexors in this design reduces the area when 
compared to standard logic. Again vias are included in each 
cell to allow the data bus to pass through the register. 
The circuit required for each octet of shift register cell 
is shown in Fig. 6.8b. This provides the control signals 
for the eight cells.
Several options for the implementation of the 8 bit down 
counter, C, were considered. These include :
. PLA Implementation 
. Parallel feedforward 
. Serial feedforward 
. Asynchronous Implementation 
The use of a PLA for implementing the counter offered 
advantages in terms of ease of layout. A parallel 
feedforward counter would provide the fastest operation at 
the expense of area. The asynchronous implementation is the
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slowest of the counters considered but occupies the 
smallest area. The serial feedforward counter is a 
compromise in terms of speed and size and for this reason 
it was decided to use this type of counter. A logic diagram 
of a single down counter cell is shown in Fig. 6.9a.
The implementation of the counter cell is shown in Fig. 
6.9b. Again the extensive use of multiplexors reduces the 
physical size of the devices. These cells can be cascaded 
to produce a down counter of the required length. A circuit 
to determine when the contents of the counter are zero must 
also be included.
6.3.3 Computation Unit.
The computation unit contains the adder. This is the only 
computation required for Blakelys algorithm. The inputs to 
the adder come from register operand register A or modulus 
register M and from the result register R. In addition to 
this there is a carry input which comes from off chip and 
an enable input. The carry input enables the cascading of 
devices to produce longer wordlengths and is obtained from 
previous stages. The enable signal comes from the control 
unit and informs the adder that the two inputs are to be 
added. The output of the adder is a 16 bit result, which 
can be loaded into register R, and a carry out which is 
passed to subsequent stages.
The design of the adder was carried out by the NMRC as it 
did not already exist in the cell library. There are many 
possible ways of implementing adders and all methods
provide different advantages and disadvantages. The method 
chosen is called a Manchester carry chain adder and offers 
a compromise in terms of speed and size.
The principle of the Manchester carry chain type adder is 
shown in Fig. 6.10. When the adder enable signal is low the 
carry out signal is pulled high by the P-transistor, Ql. 
When the adder enable signal goes high n-transistor, Q2, is 
turned on. If the carry generate signal is high, (Aj_.Bj_,
where A^ and B^ are input bits to the adder) , then
transistor Q3 will turn on discharging the carry output
node. If the carry propagate signal (Aj_+BjJ is high then
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transistor Q4 is turned on enabling the carry from the 
previous stage to be propagated through to the next stage.
The adder was designed as a 4 bit cascadable unit. The 
logic diagram and circuit layout of a 4 bit module are 
shown in Fig. 6.11a and 6.11b respectively.
6.3.4 Cascade and Master/Slave Unit.
The Cascade and Master/Slave consists of a number of 
small circuits. The signals needed for cascading of devices 
are the inputs and outputs of the shift registers R and B 
i.e Rin, Bin, Rout, Bout and the carry in, Cin, and carry 
out, Cout, of the adder. The adder poses a problem when 
cascading as the time required for addition increases as 
devices are cascaded. Sufficient time must be allowed for 
addition and as there is no way of knowing how many devices 
will be cascaded the total addition time is not known. 
Several solutions to this problem of addition time were 
considered:
1. Set a maximum limit on the number of devices which 
can be cascaded. This will determine a maximum
addition time which can be used in all cases.
2. Determine the worst case addition time for a single 
device. Multiply this by the number of devices in 
cascade and use this to determine the maximum clock 
speed that can be used with the device.
3. Construct an extra register on chip which can be 
programmed with the number of devices to be cascaded. 
This programming can be done at manufacture or 
preferably by the end user. The required addition
time is then some function of the number stored in 
the register. Alternatively the bit count register C 
could be used to determine the addition time. C
contains the number of bits in the keylength which is
N by the number of devices, where N is the data path 
width per device.
4. Generate an Addition Complete signal on chip. This 
signal is then passed to the next chip where it is 
ANDed with its Addition complete signal and passed to
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the next chip and so on. The Addition Complete signal 
from the most significant chip is then used as an 
Addition Finished signal which is passed to all 
chips.
The first option while easiest to implement has many 
disadvantages. The total addition time would need to be the 
worst case for the largest possible number of cascaded 
devices. Use of the devices for smaller keylengths would 
not produce any increase in speed.
The second option would allow the user to increase the 
speed of addition for short keylengths. However the use of 
the clock as a controlling device poses some problems. The 
first is that in most microprocessor systems the clock is 
crystal controlled and as such cannot be varied. Fractions 
of the clock could be obtained using dividers but this 
requires extra circuitry. Another problem is that there are 
clock cycles within the device during which addition is not 
performed e.g shifting of registers etc. It is not 
necessary to slow these down fo long keylengths and 
choosing the clock speed to suit the adder delay would do 
this, resulting in a significant increase in multiplication 
time.
The use of an extra register to hold the adder delay or 
the derivation of that delay from the bit counter overcomes 
many of the disadvantages of the previous options. The 
register would have to be user programmable to maintain 
flexibility. The use of the bit counter would make the 
control sequence more complex and hence it would require 
more space.
The generation of an Addition Complete signal on chip 
differs from previous options in that previous knowledge of 
the number of cascaded devices is not required, the total 
addition time is the time taken for the Addition Complete 
signal to propagate from the least to the most significant 
device. The main advantage of this is that the add time is 
automatically suited to the number of devices. Its 
advantage over the previous method of using the bit counter 
is that the control sequence is not as complicated and also 
that the Addition complete signal does not have to be based
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on the worst case addition time and should thus be faster.
It was therefore decided to chose the final option to 
determine the addition time. This resulted in an extra 
three pins being required by the device, Addition Complete 
In, AIN, Addition Complete Out, AOUT, and Addition 
Finished, ADFIN. The addition finished signal, ADFIN, is 
used by the control unit to determine when addition is 
complete.
The logic diagram of the circuit used and the circuit 
layout are shown in Figs. 6.12a and 6.12b.
The Master/Slave unit consists of a number of 
multiplexers controlled by the Master/Slave signal. The 
first multiplexer selects between the most significant bit 
of register B, BOUT, and the signal DIN. The control unit 
needs the most significant bit of register B on which to 
base a decision. If the device is in Master mode then BOUT 
is the most significant bit and this is passed to the 
Master control unit and to all other devices via the DOUT 
signal. If the device is in Slave mode then the most 
significant bit of B is obtained from DIN, which is 
connected to DOUT of the Master device. In Slave mode the 
device ignores the most significant bit of its own B 
register.
The second multiplexer is used in the determination of 
sign. The sign of the result is determined by the most 
significant bit of the Adder. Therefore if the device is in 
Master mode it uses this bit as the sign bit. The master 
device also sends the sign bit to all Slave devices via the 
Sign Out, SGNO, signal. If the device is in Slave mode it 
ignores the most significant bit of its own adder and 
obtains the sign bit from the Sign In, SGNI, signal. The 
cascading of of Master and Slave devices to produce long 
wordlengths is shown in FIG. (6.3).
6.3.5 Control Unit
The Control unit is a finite state machine which controls 
all the other hardware in the device. The state machine 
implements Blakelys algorithm as can be seen fom the state
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diagram of FIG. 6.13. The number of internal states is 16 , 
hence requiring 4 state variables. The control unit also 
has 5 inputs and 8 outputs which are :
Inputs :
ADFIN
SIGN
CZ
BI
RUN
The Addition Complete signal from the Master 
device. This is used to determine when addition 
is finished so that the control sequence can 
continue.
The Sign Bit which is also obtained from the 
Master device.
An signal produced by the bit counter, C, to 
indicate that its contents are zero.
The most significant bit of the control register, 
B. This is again obtained from the Master device 
and passed to all Slave devices.
The signal which starts the state machine and 
hence Blakelys algorithm.
Outputs :
ADEN
SAM
LDR
SR
SB
CLRR
DEC
BUSY
Adder enable.
Select A or M. Selects the output of either the 
operand register A or the modulus register M as 
input to the adder.
Loads the result register from the output of the 
adder.
Shifts the contents of the result register R left 
by one bit.
As above but for the B register.
Clear the contents of the result register R to 
zero.
Decrement the bit counter C by one.
Signal which indicates that the algorithm is in 
progress and that the device is busy.
The state diagram described above implements Blakelys 
algorithm on a serial/parallel multiplier as described in 
the previous chapter, however several points are worth
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noting. There are two major sequences that are carried out. 
These are the addition of A and R, and the addition of R 
and -M. The test to check if the result is greater than the 
modulus is performed by subtracting M from R. If the output 
of the adder is negative then R was less than M and no 
further action is taken. If however the result was positive 
then R was greater than M and so it is replaced by the 
output of the adder.
The control unit was implemented using a programmable 
logic array(PLA). This produced two advantages over a 
dedicated control unit, size and the ease of modifying the 
control algorithm should that be necessary.
A block diagram of the PLA used is shown in Fig. 6.14. 
This consists of an AND plane, an OR plane and product 
terms. Inputs are made to the AND plane and outputs are 
taken from the OR plane. Programming of the device is 
carried out by placing transistors at the junction of the 
AND/OR plane and the product terms. Feedback from the 
output to the input is used to implement a state machine. 
The size of the PLA is determined by the number of inputs, 
the number of outputs and the number of product terms. The 
logic equations resulting from the state diagram were 
reduced both manually and automatically to minimise the 
size of the PLA.
The PLA used is a dynamic type requiring a two phase 
clock. Programming of the device requires that transistor 
cells be placed in the appropriate location.
6.4 DEVICE PERFORMANCE
The speed of the modular multiplication device is limited 
by the carry propagation delay of the adder. Let the carry 
propagation delay of a single device be TA . As can be seen 
from FIG. (6.13) the control algorithm has 16 possible 
internal states, of which 14 lie within the main programme 
loop. Three additions are performed per main loop, thus the 
loop time is :
1 4 T A + ( 3 N B / 2 ) T A
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where TA is the minimum clock period, determined by the 
carry propagation delay and is the keylength in bytes. 
As each device can accomodate 16 bits NB/2 is the number of 
devices required for a given keylength.
The main programme loop is carried out 8Nb times. 
Initialisation of the device requires that 7 bytes be 
loaded into each device, two each for the operand A, the 
control register B, the modulus register M and one for the 
bit counter C. The total time for the modular 
multiplication is therefore :
[ (7Nb /2) + 8Nb (14 + (3Nb /2)) ]TA 
= (12Nb2 + 116NB )TA
Simulaion results from the adder show a maximum carry 
propagation delay of several hundred nanoseconds. As the 
device is designed to work with standard 8 bit 
microprocessors a 1MHz clock could be used. This would 
produce a multiplication time of :
(12Nb2 + 116Nb ) microseconds
A table showing the multiplication time for various values 
of Nb is shown in FIG. (6.15) .
Fabrication of the device by the NMRC has just been 
completed and testing to verify the above figures has now 
to be started.
6.5 ENCRYPTION USING THE MMD
The modular multiplication device can be interfaced to 
standard 8 bit microprocessors in the same way as memory. 
The only additional requirement is that two bits of i/o 
are necessary , one for starting the device (RUN) , the 
other for determining that the result is ready (BUSY) . The 
devices can be cascaded to produce the desired wordlength, 
the ultimate limitation being the carry propagation delay 
of the adder and the size of the bit counter C. The time 
required for exponentiation, as shown in chapter 2 is given
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by :
Te = 53 + 2583Nb + 2432NB2 + 32NB [TM o d [NB ]] cycles
where TMod^NB] tbe number of clock cycles for
multiplication of two NB byte numbers modulo a third NB 
byte number. Substituting for the multiplication time of 
the modular multiplication time into the above equation , 
and assuming a clock frequency of 1MHz, yields :
Te = 53 + 2583Nb + 2432NB2 + 32NB [12NB2+ 116NB ]]
= 53 + 2583Nb + 6144Nb2 + 384NB 3 
microseconds
A table showing the exponentiation time for various values 
of Nb is shown in Fig. (6.16).
For an 80 byte (approx. 200 decimal digits) the use of 
the hardware device results in an exponentiation time of 
approximately 240 seconds. The fastest software algorithm 
(reciprocal), described in chapter 3 has an exponentiation 
time of 2500 seconds. An order of magnitude increase in 
encryption speed can therefore be expected.
6.6 FURTHER ENHANCEMENTS
The modular multiplication device described here was 
implemented in 5 micron CMOS technology at the NMRC. Since 
then the NMRC has introduced a 3 micron process. This would 
provide a 2.5 fold increase in the space available on chip 
with a subsequent increase in the number of bits per 
device. There are some commercial processes which are at
1.2 micron densities. This would provide a 17 fold increase 
in area.
The design of the circuit could also be changed to 
eliminate the need for loading the operands into the device 
prior to each multiplication. In the modular exponentiation 
algorithm described in chapter 2, only two type of modular
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multiplications are performed , T = T*T and C = C*T. The 
storage of the partial results C and T on-chip may be 
possible and this would increase the exponentiation time.
Ill
Concept
Block
Design
Simulate
Logic
Design
Simulate
Circuit
Design
Extract &
Simulate
Layout
Simulate  
DRC, ERC
Fabricate
Fig. (6.1) Integrated Circuit Design Process
1 1 2
Data
Bus Address
Bus
AOUT : Addition com ple te  out 
BOUT : MSB o f con tro l reg is te r B 
ROUT : MSB o f resu lt reg is te r R 
COUT : C arry ou t from  adder
DIN : MSB o f B from  M aster Device
SGNI : Sign input
SGNO : Sign ou tp u t
DOUT : MSB o f B from  M aster Device
CIN : C arry in from  previous s tage
RIN : MSB o f R from  previous stoge
BIN : MSB o f B from  previous stage
AIN : Addition com ple te  from  previous stage
R /W  : R ea d /w rite  signal from  m icroprocessor
Fig. (6 .3 ) Cascading of devices
ITT
Registers:
A: Operond 1
B: Operand 2
M: Modulus
R: Result
C: Bit Counter
Fig. (6 .4 ) Modular M u ltip lica tion  Device
1 1 4
/Rin Bin Din R\W CS Do 3o A2 A1 AO
Rout M\S Run D7 D6 D5
Fig. (6.4a) Chip layout - Floor Plan
115
External
Interface
A0.A1.A2
I/O O ..I/O 7
R /W
C /S
DinO..Din7
Dout0..15
LDx(L)
LDx(M)
External address bus 
External data  bus 
R ead/W rite  signal 
Chip select
Internal input data bus 
Internal output data bus 
Select least significant byte of 
Select m ost significant byte o1
Fig. (6 .6  Interface Unit
Internal
Interface
x
x
1 1 6
Input
Data
Bus
D,
D7
RegCell 
4 d  q  —
->C 0  -
D 0
>C Q 
R "7
1
A(M)o"
0 Q
>c o
R
7~
A(M), Output
Data
Bus
A(M )7
Load Reset Output
Enable
Fig. (6 .6 a )  Logic diagram -  Registers A and M
Input
Reset
Load
Vdd
Vss
Output
Enable'
u Li U  U  lTLj , .
s s ° i  r < '  3O K &
c
M
1
V
CM1DREGC CM1TRPI
I
A
; S * I°  a a O o i  1 1
. . . . . .  , , . n  n  n
RegCell
Output
Fig. (6 .6 b ) Layout of simple register cell
117
d7
SRegCell
De
Do
Load.Shift
Load
Shift
5 F \
5 ^
£>
&
ih
D Q
>C Q 
R
D Q
>C Q 
R
D 0
t>C Q 
RTZ
R(B);
R(B)<
R(B)c
Clock Reset
R(B)_,
Fig. (6 .7 a ) Logic diagram -  Shift Register R,B 
Di
Shift
Load
Load.shift
Q i-1
Vdd _
Vss
Clock
Reset
QiLT □ □' □ LTD" u  U Ü" u u u u u
1 ' 1 I 4 5 S * § !°| °|liJ ut u
CM1TRPI CM1TRPI CM1TRPI CM1DFFC
i l l £ I I a I 1 1 t *o a a 0 an n n n.nn. _n_n n_ n n n n n
Fig. (6 .7 b ) Shift Register Cell -  Layout
118
t>
t >
t>
Shift
Lood
Lood.Shift
To
SRegCells
LDR(LDB)
SR(SB)
One end cell for every 
8 SRegCells
Fig. (6 .8 a )  End cell for shift registers R, B
Shift
Fig. (6 .8 b ) Layout of end cell
Input
Data
Bus
Output
Data
Bus
Fig. (6 .9 a ) Logic diagram -  Down counter
Di-
Co
Fig. ( 6 . 9 b )  Layout of down counter cell
1 2 0
Vdd
C orry o u t
P  : P ro p o g o te  
C : G enero te
Principle o f M o n c h e ster c o rry -c h o in
C orry In PO
GO-
Clock
Vdd
_L
\
G1 ■
P 2
■\\ G2 •
PJ5
G J -
T
Vss
Pi -  oi XOR bi 
Gi -  oi ANO b!
4  bit c o rry  choin
Fig. (6 .1 0 ) Manchester corry-cha in
C arry
Out
o -
1 2 1
Fig. (6 .11a) 4  bit adder -  logic
oQ bO o1 b1 o 2  b 2  o 3  b 3
C orry lr.
INV2 INV2 INV2 INV2
PC PG PG PG
M M M M
NEXOR NEXOR NEXOR NEXOR
SO S1 S2 S 3
M : M a n c h este r c o rry  cell
PC : Generation of propagate and generate terms
Fig. (6.11b) 4  bit adder -  layout
C orry O ut
1 2 2
ADEN
D Q
C 0
R A
o - ■ D Q
->C 0
L-g-l
■ = D -
Aout
Cin Ain Clk Reset
ADEN : Adder enable signal from control unit
Ain : Addition com plete signal from previous stage
Aout : Addition com plete signal to next stage
Cin ; Carry in from previous stage
Fig. (6 .12a ) Addition Complete circuit
ADEN
Ain
U Li u u u u u i r i i j ........................ ............ i_i L i Li
V d d _
3 4 ï  S 3 2 ï  S 3 2 3 » 2 3 r i  r r i  i ° * 2 3
C
M
1 CM1NAND3 CM1NAND3 CM12INV CM1DRECC CM1DRECC CM10R2
V ss
N
V
3 i ï  2 2 3 i  2 2 3 3 s 2 5 !  J  L l . i  1 . s 2 3. : : , n n n n n n p  n n  n  n  n n . n p  o n . n n n  n n n n n
Clock
Reset
Fig. (6 .12b ) Addition com plete circuit 
-  Layout
1 2 3
Fig. (6 .1 3 ) S ta te  diagram  -  Blakelys algorithm
124
(6
.1
4
) 
B
lock 
diagram
 
of 
PLA
Key L e n g th  
(B y te s )
M u l t i p l i c a t i o n  
Tim e (uS)
Key L e n g th  
(B y te s )
M u l t i p l i c a t i o n  
Tim e (uS)
2 280 42 26040
4 656 44 28336
6 1128 46 30728
8 1696 48 33216
10 2360 50 35800
12 3120 52 38480
14 3976 54 41256
16 4928 56 44128
18 5976 58 47096
20 7120 60 50160
22 8360 62 53320
24 9696 64 56576
26 11128 66 59928
28 12656 68 63376
30 14280 70 66920
32 16000 72 70560
34 17816 74 74296
36 19728 76 78128
38 21736 78 82056
40 23840 80 86080
F i g .  (6 . 15) M u l t i p l i c a t i o n  t im e  u s in g  t h e  MMD
Key L e n g th E n c r y p t io n Key L e n g th E n c r y p t io n
(B y te s ) T im e (Sec) (B y te s ) Time (Sec)
10 1 .0 46 50
12 1 .5 48 56
14 2 .2 50 63
16 3 .1 52 70
18 4 .2 54 78
20 5 .5 56 86
22 7 .1 58 95
24 8 .9 60 105
26 10 62 115
28 13 64 125
30 15 66 137
32 18 68 149
34 22. 70 161
36 25 72 175
38 30 74 189
40 34 76 204
42 39 78 219
44 44 80 236
Fig. (6.16) Encryption time using the MMD
1 2 6
7. Conclusion
An i n v e s t i g a t i o n  i n t o  t h e  im p le m e n t a t io n  o f  t h e  RSA 
c i p h e r  on a s t a n d a r d  8 b i t  m ic r o p r o c e s s o r ,  t h e  M o to r o la
M6809 was c a r r i e d  o u t .  A program m e f o r  m o d u la r
e x p o n e n t i a t i o n ,  w h ic h  i s  t h e  b a s is  o f  t h e  RSA p u b l i c  key
c i p h e r ,  was w r i t t e n .  The a l g o r i t h m  used  i s  known as
e x p o n e n t i a t i o n  by r e p e a t e d  s q u a r in g  and m u l t i p l y i n g .  The 
ru n  t im e  o f  t h i s  a l g o r i t h m  was c a l c u l a t e d  and was fo u n d  t o  
be d e p e n d e n t  on t h e  t im e  r e q u i r e d  f o r  m o d u la r  
m u l t i p l i c a t i o n .
Two fo rm s  o f  m o d u la r  m u l t i p l i c a t i o n  a l g o r i t h m  w ere  
i d e n t i f i e d .  The f i r s t  c a l c u l a t e d  t h e  p r o d u c t  u s in g  n o rm a l  
a r i t h m e t i c  and t h e n  c a l c u l a t e d  t h e  r e s i d u e .  The second  fo rm  
c a l c u l a t e d  t h e  r e s i d u e  s im u l t a n e o u s ly  w i t h  t h e  p r o d u c t .
I n  t h e  f i r s t  t y p e  o f  a l g o r i t h m  t h e  f o r m a t i o n  o f  th e  
p r o d u c t  d i d  n o t  ch a n g e , how ever v a r i o u s  ways o f  c a l c u l a t i n g  
t h e  r e s id u e s  w ere  im p le m e n te d  w i t h  s i g n i f i c a n t  d i f f e r e n c e s  
i n  p e r f o r m a n c e .  The s i m i l a r i t y  b e tw e e n  t h e  f o r m a t i o n  o f  
r e s id u e s  and d i v i s i o n  a l lo w e d  d i v i s i o n  a l g o r i t h m ,  w i t h  t h e  
em phas is  on t h e  r e m a in d e r  and n o t  on t h e  q u o t i e n t  t o  be 
u s e d .  The m ethods used  f o r  c a l c u l a t i n g  t h e  r e s id u e s  w e re ,  
d i v i s i o n  by r e p e a t e d  s h i f t  and s u b t r a c t ,  d i v i s i o n  by  
fo r m in g  t h e  r e c i p r o c a l  and m u l t i p l y i n g  and d i v i s i o n  u s in g  
K n u th s  a l g o r i t h m .
The second  t y p e  o f  m o d u la r  m u l t i p l i c a t i o n  a l g o r i t h m ,  
w h ic h  c a l c u l a t e d  t h e  r e s id u e s  s im u l t a n e o u s ly  w i t h  t h e  
p r o d u c t  was im p le m e n te d  i n  a s s e m le r  la n g u a g e  u s in g  an 
a l g o r i t h m  by B l a k e l y ,  t h e  a d v a n ta g e  o f  t h i s  a p p ro a c h  i s  
t h a t  a d o u b le  l e n g t h  p r o d u c t  i s  n e v e r  fo rm e d ,  t h e  l a r g e s t  
number t h a t  m ust be  d e a l t  w i t h  i s  t w i c e  t h e  m o d u lu s .
The p e r fo r m a n c e  o f  a l l  o f  t h e  m o d u la r  m u l t i p l i c a t i o n  
a l g o r i t h m s ,  i n  te rm s  o f  t h e i r  r u n  t im e  f o r  d i f f e r e n t  
m odulus l e n g t h ,  was e v a l u a t e d .  The r e s u l t s  showed t h a t  
fo r m in g  t h e  r e c i p r o c a l  and m u l t i p l y i n g  i s  t h e  f a s t e s t  
m ethod f o l l o w e d  c l o s e l y  by K n uth s  a l g o r i t h m .  These a r e  th e n  
f o l l o w e d  by t h e  s h i f t  and s u b t r a c t  a l g o r i t h m  nad  B l a k e ly s  
a l g o r i t h m ,  b o t h  o f  w h ic h  a r e  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  s lo w e r  th a n  
e i t h e r  o f  t h e  f i r s t  tw o .
The e n c r y p t i o n  t im e  u s in g  t h e s e  m ic r o p r o c e s s o r
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program m es was fo u n d  t o  be q u i t e  s i g n i f i c a n t .  R i v e s t ,  
S h am ir  and Adlem an i n  t h e i r  o r i g i n a l  p a p e r  recommended t h a t  
k e y  l e n g t h s  o f  t h e  o r d e r  o f  200  d e c im a l  d i g i t s  (o r  
a p p r o x im a t e ly  80 b y t e s )  s h o u ld  be u s e d  i f  a h ig h  l e v e l  o f  
s e c u r i t y  and p r o t e c t i o n  a g a in s t  f u t u r e  d e v e lo p m e n ts  i s  
r e q u i r e d .  The t im e  t a k e n  t o  e n c r y p t  messages o f  t h i s  s i z e  
u s in g  t h e  f a s t e s t  o f  t h e  above s o f t w a r e  a l g o r i t h m s  i s  
a p p r o x im a t e ly  40 m in u te s .  T h is  i m p l i e s  a b i t  r a t e  o f  1 /4  
b i t s  p e r  se c o n d . I f  we re d u c e  t h e  k ey  t o  40 b y t e s  (a p p ro x .  
100 d e c im a l  d i g i t s )  th e n  t h e  e n c r y p t i o n  t im e  re d u c e s  t o  322  
seconds o r  a b i t  r a t e  o f  one b i t  p e r  sec o n d .
T h is  s lo w  t r a n s m is s io n  r a t e  may be o f  some use i n  a 
l i m i t e d  number o f  cas es  e . g  e n c r y p t i o n  o f  f i l e s  p r i o r  t o  
lo n g  te r m  s t o r a g e  b u t  i t  i s  o f  no use  f o r  a g e n e r a l  p u rp o s e  
e n c r y p t i o n  d e v i c e .  S e v e r a l  s o l u t i o n s  t o  t h e  p ro b le m  w ere  
c o n s id e r e d .  These w ere  :
1 .  Reduce t h e  key  l e n g t h  even  f u r t h e r  ( i . e  < 4 0 b y te s )
2 .  F in d  a more e f f i c i e n t  a l g o r i t h m .
3 .  Im p le m e n t p a r t  o f  t h e  a l g o r i t h m  i n  h a r d w a r e .
The t h i r d  s o l u t i i o n ,  h a rd w a re  im p le m e n t a t io n  o f  some o f  t h e  
k e y  e le m e n ts  o f  t h e  e n c r y p t i o n  p r o c e s s ,  a p p e a re d  t o  o f f e r  
t h e  b e s t  chance  f o r  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  r e d u c in g  t h e  e n c r y p t i o n  
t im e  and i t  was d e c id e d  t o  f o l l o w  t h i s  o p t i o n .
The g e n e r a t i o n  o f  keys  f o r  use  i n  t h e  RSA c i p h e r  was 
d e s c r ib e d .  The s e c u r i t y  o f  t h e  RSA c i p h e r  was shown t o  
r e s i d e  i n  t h e  k e y  i t s e l f .  V a r io u s  fo rm s  o f  a t t a c k s  a g a in s t  
t h e  RSA c i p h e r  h a v e  a h i g h e r  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  s u c e e d in g  i f  
t h e  k e y  i s  n o t  chosen  c o r r e c t l y .  A p r o c e d u r e ,  d e v e lo p e d  by  
K n u th ,  was im p le m e n te d  i n  FORTRAN on t h e  VAX. The ru n  t im e  
o f  t h i s  program m e i s  s i g n i f i c a n t  (15  m in u te s  f o r  100 d i g i t  
k e y s )  and t h e  l i m i t a t i o n  t h i s  p l a c e s  on f r e q u e n t  c h a n g in g  
o f  t h e  key  i s  p a r t i c u l a r y  s e v e r e  i n  a p e r s o n a l  c o m p u te r  o r  
m ic r o p r o c e s s o r  e n v i r o n m e n t .
An i n v e s t i g a t i o n  i n t o  t h e  v a r i o u s  m ethods o f  h a rd w a re  
m u l t i p l i c a t i o n  r e s u l t e d  i n  t h e  c h o ic e  o f  a s e r i a l / p a r a l l e l  
m u l t i p l i e r .  I t  was t h o u g h t  t h a t  t h i s  o f f e r e d  t h e  b e s t  
com prom ise i n  te r m s  o f  speed  and s p a c e .  B la k e ly s  a l g o r i t h m  
a l t h o u g h  t h e  s lo w e s t  o f  t h e  s o f t w a r e  im p le m e n ta t io n s  le n d s
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i t s e l f ,  w i t h  s m a l l  m o d i f i c a t i o n s ,  t o  a h a rd w a re  s o l u t i o n .  
I t  was th u s  d e c id e d  t h e  h a rd w a re  s h o u ld  im p le m e n t  B l a k e ly s  
a l g o r i t h m  on a s e r i a l / p a r a l l e l  m u l t i p l i e r .
T h re e  a p p ro a c h e s  f o r  p r o d u c in g  t h e  r e q u i r e d  h a rd w a re  
s o l u t i o n  w ere  c o n s id e r e d .  These w e re ,  a d e d ic a t e d  c i r c u i t  
u s i n  s t a n d a r d  S S I and MSI l o g i c ,  a c i r c u i t  u s in g  b i t  s l i c e  
m ic r o p r o c e s s o r  t e c h n iq u e s  and t h e  d e s ig n  o f  an a p p l i c a t i o n  
s p e c i f i c  i n t e g r a t e d  c i r c u i t  (ASIC) u s in g  g a t e  a r r a y  o r  
s t a n d a r d  c e l l  t e c h n i q u e s .
The im p le m e n t a t io n  o f  t h e  h a rd w a re  u s in g  a s ta n d a r d  
c e l l  AS IC  was c h o s e n .  The re a s o n  f o r  t h i s  c h o ic e  was t h e  
a v a i l i b i l i t y  o f  t h e  n e c e s s a r y  f a c i l i t i e s  a t  t h e  N a t i o n a l  
M i c r o e l e c t r o n i c  R e s e a rc h  C e n tr e  (NMRC) and t h e  r e c e i p t  o f  a 
g r a n t  f ro m  t h e  N a t i o n a l  B o ard  f o r  S c ie n c e  and T e c h n o lo g y  
(NBST now E o la s )  t o  c a r r y  o u t  t h e  w o rk .
The d e s ig n  o f  t h e  i n t e g r a t e d  c i r c u i t  was c a r r i e d  o u t  a t  
N . I . H . E  D u b l in  and  a t  t h e  N .M .R .C  i n  C o rk .  A 16 b i t  m o d u la r  
m u l t i p l i e r  b a s e d  on B la k e ly s  a l g o r i t h m  and u s in g  a 
s e r i a l / p a r a l l e l  m u l t i p l i e r  was d e s ig n e d .  The m u l t i p l i e r  was 
im p le m e n te d  u s in g  CMOS s t a n d a r d  c e l l s  and t h e  5 m ic ro n  
p r o c e s s  te c h n o lo g y  a t  t h e  N .M .R .C .  A f t e r  s i m u l a t i o n  o f  th e  
d e s ig n  l a y o u t  o f  t h e  d e v ic e  was c a r r i e d  o u t .  F u r t h e r  
s i m u l a t i o n  and v e r i f i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  d e v ic e  w ere  n e c e s s a ry  
b e f o r e  f a b r i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  d e v ic e .
S i m u l a t i o n  r e s u l t s  f ro m  t h e  d e v ic e  show t h a t  an o r d e r  o f  
m a g n itu d e  i n c r e a s e  i n  e n c r y p t i o n  t im e  can  be e x p e c te d .  
F a b r i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  i n t e g r a t e d  c i r c u i t  has j u s t  been  
c o m p le te d  and t e s t i n g  t o  v e r i f y  t h e s e  f i g u r e s  has y e t  t o  be  
d o n e .
The in c r e a s e  i n  speed  o f  t h e  a l g o r i t h m  by  an o r d e r  o f  
m a g n i tu d e ,  w h ic  w i l l  g i v e  a b i t  r a t e  o f  10bps f o r  a 40 b y t e  
k e y ,  i s  s t i l l  n o t  s u f f i c i e n t  f o r  a g e n e r a l  p u rp o s e  
e n c r y p t i o n  d e v i c e .  C o n v e n t io n a l  c i p h e r  s y s te m s , such as 
DES, can  a c h ie v e  b i t  r a t e s  i n  t h e  m e g a b its  p e r  second  
r a n g e .  F u r t h e r  i n c r e a s e s  i n  t h e  speed  o f  p u b l i c  k e y  c ip h e r s  
w i l l  o c c u r  w i t h  a d v an ces  i n  i n t e g r a t e d  c i r c u i t  t e c h n o lo g y  
and w i t h  t h e  d is c o v e r y  o f  more e f f i c i e n t  a l g o r i t h m s .  
A d vances  i n  i n t e g r a t e d  c i r c u i t  t e c h n o lo g y  w i l l  a l l o w  a 
g r e a t e r  d e n s i t y  o f  d e v ic e s  p e r  c h ip  and th u s  t h e  
i n t e g r a t i o n  o f  more o r  a l l  o f  t h e  p u b l i c  k e y  c i p h e r .  T h is
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w o u ld  re d u c e  t h e  b o t t l e n e c k s  i n h e r e n t  i n  t r a n s f e r r i n g  
i n f o r m a t i o n  t o  an f ro m  t h e  e n c r y p t i o n  d e v ic e .  D i f f e r e n t  
a l g o r i t h m s ,  more s u i t e d  t o  h a rd w a re  i m p le m e n t a t io n ,  may 
a l s o  in c r e a s e  t h e  o v e r a l l  l e v e l  o f  p e r f o r m a n c e .
U n t i l  t h e n  t h e  b e s t  com prom ise w o u ld  a p p e a r  t o  be a 
c o m b in a t io n  o f  p u b l i c  and p r i v a t e  k e y  c i p h e r s .  The p u b l i c  
k e y  c i p h e r  c o u ld  be u se d  t o  d i s t r i b u t e  s e s s io n  key s  f o r  use  
b y  a c o n v e n t io n a l  c i p h e r ,  such as DES.
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ADDENDUM
Two ways o f implementing the con tro l u n it were considered :
1. Dedicated Design
2. PLA
The dedicated design implemented the contro l u n it  using standard lo g ic  
gates and f l ip - f lo p s .  An in ve s tiga tio n  was ca rried  out to determine
the space required by th is  approach. The lo g ic  elements occupied
2
1.7mm . This did not include routing between the devices. A ru le  o f 
thumb, used at the N.M.R.C, requires tha t an equal amount o f space be 
allowed fo r  ro u tin g . This resu lted  in  a to ta l space requirement o f
3.4mm2 .
The PLA is  designed on a modular basis. This allows fo r  f le x ib i l i t y  in  
the number o f inp u ts , outputs and product terms th a t can be
accomadated by the PLA. The PLA used is  a dynamic type and requires a 
clock and precharging. To ease the construction  process the PLA was 
designed so tha t c e lls  could be placed together to form the complete 
u n it .  Programming o f the AND and OR planes is  ca rrie d  out by placing a
c e ll (ANDPROG or ORPROG) a t the junc tion  o f the AND or OR plane and
the product l in e .
The size o f the PLA ( based on 9 inputs, 12 outputs and 21 product 
terms ) was ca lcu la ted to be 2.5mm . Routing w ith in  the contro l u n it  
is  not required in  th is  implementation due to the regular nature o f 
the PLA.
Choice o f method.
The PLA was chosen as i t  requires less space than the d iscre te  
vers ion . Another advantage of the PLA is  th a t the con tro l a lgorithm
can be m odified, w ithou t a ffe c tin g  the size o f the PLA (provid ing the
number o f inpu ts, outputs and product terms remains constan t).
Al. The use of a PLA in the Control Unit.
A2. Control and Data Path.
The modular m u lt ip lic a t io n  device could be broken in to  two d if fe re n t 
areas. The f i r s t  was ca lled  the data path, as i t  involved the storage 
and m anipulation o f the data. The second, c a lle d  the contro l path, 
implemented the con tro l a lgorithm . The reason fo r  th is  d iv is io n  was 
th a t some of the functions o f the m u lt ip lic a t io n  device were dependent 
on the length o f the operands w hile  others were no t. The s ize , or 
w id th , o f the data path ( i . e  the number o f b its  required fo r the 
operands) could be changed to s u it  space re s tra in ts  whereas the size 
o f the con tro l path was fixed  and could not be changed.
A3. Width o f Data Path.
One o f the requirements o f the modular m u lt ip lic a t io n  device was the 
i t  should handle as long a key length as po ss ib le . The u ltim a te  l im i t  
on the key s ize would be determined by the space ava ilab le  on the 
s il ic o n  d ie . The elements o f the data path were there fore  designed on 
a modular basis, e.g a one b i t  s h i f t  re g is te r  was designed. When a l l  
the elements were designed an estimate o f the space required fo r 
d if fe re n t key lengths was made. This exercise showed tha t a key length 
o f 16 b its  was the maximum th a t could be accomadated on the 6 .Inn by 
6.1mm d ie .
